Is carbon risk priced in the cross-section of corporate bond returns? by DUAN, Tinghua et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
10-2020 
Is carbon risk priced in the cross-section of corporate bond 
returns? 
Tinghua DUAN 
Frank Weikai LI 
Singapore Management University, wkli@smu.edu.sg 
Quan WEN 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Citation 
DUAN, Tinghua; LI, Frank Weikai; and WEN, Quan. Is carbon risk priced in the cross-section of corporate 
bond returns?. (2020). 1-57. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6606 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
Is Carbon Risk Priced in the Cross Section
of Corporate Bond Returns?∗
Tinghua Duan Frank Weikai Li Quan Wen
October 2020
Abstract
This paper examines the pricing of a firm’s carbon risk, measured by its carbon
emissions intensity, in the cross section of corporate bond returns. Contrary to
the “carbon risk premium” hypothesis, we find bonds of firms with higher carbon
emissions intensity earn significantly lower returns. This effect cannot be explained
by a comprehensive list of bond characteristics and exposure to known risk factors.
Investigating sources of the low carbon premium, we find the underperformance
of bonds issued by carbon-intensive firms cannot be fully explained by divestment
from institutional investors. Instead, our evidence is most consistent with investor
underreaction to carbon risk, as carbon emissions intensity is predictive of lower future
cash flow news, deteriorating firm creditworthiness, and more frequent environmental
incidents.
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1 Introduction
Scientists predict a rise in average global temperatures by the end of this century, and many
policy makers warn about the potentially dramatic damage that climate change could have
on the global economy (Hsiang et al., 2017). Stringent governmental regulations and law
enforcement are needed to mitigate the potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change.
Accumulations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the earth’s atmosphere mostly cause climate
change, so any regulation should be targeted at significantly curbing firms’ carbon emissions
(e.g., via a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system).
Climate change mitigation policies likely produce heterogeneous effects across firms in the
economy. Effects are likely most relevant for carbon-intensive firms, as regulations that limit
carbon emissions can lead to stranded assets or a large increase in operating costs for carbon-
intensive firms. In addition, carbon-intensive firms may experience higher financing costs if
banks reduce funding to and institutional investors shun from such firms, due to climate-related
capital requirements and general trends towards sustainable investing in financial markets
(Delis, De Greiff, and Ongena, 2019; Krueger, Sautner, and Starks, 2020).1 Furthermore, more
stringent emission regulations are likely to be proposed and implemented as the global climate
worsens, leading to deteriorating fundamental values of carbon-intensive firms just when climate
change matters most to investors’ welfare. Conjectures about climate change naturally lead to
the prediction that securities issued by carbon-intensive firms are riskier because they tend to
lose value in states of the world where investors dislike and have a higher marginal utility of
consumption. As a result, traditional asset pricing theories predict that investors should demand
higher expected returns for holding securities issued by carbon-intensive firms to compensate
investors for their higher exposure to carbon risks (the “carbon risk premium” hypothesis).
In this study, we examine the pricing of carbon risk in the U.S. corporate bond market.
We focus on corporate bonds for several reasons. First, unlike stocks, corporate bonds have
limited upside potential but are significantly exposed to downside risks (Hong and Sraer, 2013;
1For example, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, said in his recent annual letter to CEOs that the company is
considering “exiting investments that present a high sustainability-related risk, such as thermal coal producers”
(Source: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter). Bank
of England Governor Andrew Bailey said the British central bank would look into introducing climate change
considerations into its corporate bond buying decisions (Source: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/
2020/july/statement-on-banks-commitment-to-combatting-climate-change).
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Bai, Bali, and Wen, 2019). Since future climate policies and regulations mainly constitute a
downside risk to carbon-intensive firms (Ilhan, Sautner, and Vilkov, 2020; Hoepner, Oikonomou,
Sautner, Starks, and Zhou, 2020), the impacts of uncertain climate policies likely matter more
for bond investors than for equity investors. Second, the clientele of corporate bonds in the
United States are mainly institutional investors, who are sophisticated and likely account for
carbon risks when investing in carbon-intensive firms.2 Third, corporate bonds differ along
important dimensions, such as credit ratings and maturities. The heterogeneity in various
bond characteristics allows us to shed more light on the underlying channels of the pricing of
carbon risk.3 Last, but not the least, the sheer size of and the possibility of fragility in the fast-
growing corporate bond market (Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng, 2017) suggest our research question
is an important one with profound policy implications.4
Despite the proliferation of academic studies on the pricing of climate risk in the equity
market (Bansal, Ochoa, and Kiku, 2016; Hong, Li, and Xu, 2019; Bolton and Kacperczyk,
2020; Engle, Giglio, Kelly, Lee, and Stroebel, 2020), few studies are devoted to understanding
the role of firms’ carbon risk in the expected returns of corporate bonds. Debt financing
forms a significant portion of firms’ capital structures, underscoring the need to study how
carbon emissions affect a firm’s cost of debt financing.5 Moreover, Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar (2007) show that the corporate bond market is becoming increasingly transparent
since the introduction of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) bond price
reporting system. Because of their growing size and improved liquidity, corporate bonds play
an increasingly important role in institutional investors’ portfolios, evidenced by the recent
influx to bond funds.6 Thus, enhancing our understanding of how carbon emissions are related
2According to flow of fund data released by the Federal Reserve Board from 1986 to 2019, approximately
78% of corporate bonds were held by institutional investors, including insurance companies, mutual funds, and
pension funds. The participation rate of individual investors in the corporate bond market is very low. A recent
survey by Krueger, Sautner, and Starks (2020) found that institutional investors indeed consider climate risks
to be important for their investment portfolios.
3For example, if investors care about carbon risks, the pricing effect should be more pronounced among
bonds with higher credit risk or longer maturities, since climate risks should mainly materialize in the long run.
4Indeed, regulators and policy makers worldwide have expressed concerns about the extent to which climate
risks could affect financial stability. Most notably, Mark Carney, the former head of the Bank of England,
recently linked these risks to financial stability (Carney, 2015). A coalition of 39 central banks, representing
about half the global economy, including the central banks of England, China, Canada, Japan, and the European
Union (but not the United States), has convened a working group to study the effects of climate change on
financial markets.
5Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2015) report that the average debt-to-assets ratio for public companies was
as high as 35% in 2010.
6See Feroli et al. (2014) and the Investment Company Institute Annual Report (2014).
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to expected returns in corporate bonds is pivotal.
We rely on firms’ carbon emissions data from Trucost and corporate bond pricing data from
the enhanced version of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). We examine
the relation between a firm’s carbon emissions intensity (CEI) and the expected return on
its corporate bonds. According to the Greenhouse Gas Protocol accounting and reporting
standard, carbon emissions from a firm’s operations and economic activities are typically
grouped into three different categories: direct emissions from production (scope 1); indirect
emissions from consumption of purchased electricity, heat, or steam (scope 2); and other indirect
emissions from the production of purchased materials, product use, waste disposal, outsourced
activities, etc. (scope 3). Following existing studies (Ilhan, Sautner, and Vilkov, 2020; In, Park,
and Monk, 2019) and industry standards, we construct our measure of CEI as carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions in units of tons scaled by a firm’s total revenues (in $millions). Following
the portfolio sorts method in Fama and French (1992), we form quintile portfolios of corporate
bonds based on firm-level (scope 1) CEI in June of each year t for firms with their fiscal year
ending in year t − 1.7 Portfolio returns are calculated from July of year t to June of year
t + 1 and rebalanced annually. Since the baseline level of carbon emissions varies intrinsically
across industries, we form value-weighted quintile portfolios within each of the 12 Fama-French
industries to control for the industry effect and to calculate the average portfolio returns across
industries. We find that the bonds of high CEI firms are riskier on average than those of low
CEI firms, as indicated by a higher bond market beta, downside risk, higher illiquidity, and
lower credit ratings. However, the bonds of high CEI firms significantly underperform the bonds
of low CEI firms over the period from July 2006 to June 2019. This finding directly contradicts
the carbon risk premium hypothesis as predicted by risk-based asset pricing models. This low
carbon premium effect is economically significant: corporate bonds in the lowest-CEI quintile
generate 1.7% (t-stat. = 2.62) per annum higher returns than bonds in the highest-CEI quintile.
We further confirm that the return predictability of CEI is robust to using various factor
models to adjust for firms’ risk exposure. We rely on three unique factor models: the five-
factor model of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), the four-factor bond market model of Bai,
7In our main analyses, we focus on scope 1 carbon emissions, the disclosure requirements for which are
stricter and for which relevant data have been more systematically reported and accurately measured. Scope 3
emissions, on the other hand, are constructed using an input-output model, and the sample coverage is more
limited.
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Bali, and Wen (2019), and the nine-factor model combining the stock and bond market factors.
Regardless of the factor model used, we find that the low-CEI portfolio significantly outperforms
the high-CEI bond portfolio, with a monthly nine-factor alpha ranging from 0.13% to 0.16%.
We also carry out subsample analyses based on bond credit ratings and maturities. The return
spreads between the low- and high-CEI portfolios are larger for non-investment-grade and
longer-maturity bonds, but remain significant for investment-grade and shorter-maturity bonds.
The return predictability of CEI persists in Fama-MacBeth regressions when we include
a comprehensive list of bond characteristics and systematic risk measures. The bond
characteristics we include are the bond market beta, downside risk as proxied for by 5% value-
at-risk (VaR), bond-level illiquidity, credit ratings, time-to-maturity, bond size, and the one-
month-lagged bond return. The systematic risk proxies include the default beta, term beta,
macroeconomic uncertainty beta (Bali, Subrahmanyam, and Wen, 2020), and climate change
news beta (Huynh and Xia, 2020). Similar to the portfolio sorting results, the cross-sectional
relation between future bond returns and firms’ carbon emissions intensity is negative and
highly significant. The multivariate regression results suggest that the CEI measure contains
distinct, significant predictive information beyond bond size, maturity, rating, liquidity, market
risk, default risk, and climate risk. The results further imply that CEI is a strong and robust
predictor of future bond returns.
We conduct a battery of robustness tests to investigate the return predictability of carbon
emissions intensity. First, our results remain similar when we construct our CEI measure based
on the scope 2 emissions, as well as scope 1 and scope 2 emissions combined. Second, we find that
the most carbon-intensive industries do not drive the low carbon premium. When we exclude
the most carbon-intensive industries including the energy, chemicals, and utilities industries,
the return spreads between low- and high-CEI bonds remain economically and statistically
significant. Third, we perform portfolio analysis at the firm level to control for the impact of
multiple bonds issued by the same firm. The results are robust to forming the value-weighted
average bond returns across the same firm or to choosing one representative bond of the largest
size or most liquid for each firm. Last, the return spread between low- and high-CEI bonds
remains significant for different subperiods and is not driven by the period containing the global
financial crisis (September 2008 to December 2009).
Our finding of a low carbon premium, combined with the evidence that bonds of carbon-
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intensive firms are riskier, suggests that the data do not support the “carbon risk premium”
hypothesis. Although risk-based theories predict that carbon emissions intensity should be
positively related to expected bond returns, the empirical relation between the two could go
in either direction. Under certain scenarios, bonds issued by greens firm (low-CEI firms)
could outperform those issued by brown firms (high-CEI firms). Pastor, Stambaugh, and
Taylor (2020) theoretically show that green assets could perform better than brown assets
if investors’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns unexpectedly strengthen.
Excess demand from ESG-conscious investors could boost the realized performance of green
assets, while hurting that of brown assets. If one computes average returns over a sample period
when ESG concerns consistently strengthened more than investors expected, green assets could
outperform brown assets. We test this “investor preference” hypothesis by examining whether a
firm’s carbon emissions intensity is predictive of subsequent changes in institutional ownership
of its corporate bonds. Using institutional holdings of corporate bonds from Thomson Reuter’s
eMAXX database, we find that institutional investors collectively divest from bonds issued by
carbon-intensive firms. Controlling for bond characteristics and systematic risk measures, we
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the natural logarithm of CEI is associated with
a 0.226-percentage-point decrease in bonds’ institutional ownership, which represents a 12.6%
reduction relative to the average change in institutional ownership in our sample.
To further investigate the implications of ownership changes for future bond returns, we
examine whether the bond return predictability of carbon emissions intensity can be fully
explained by shifts in institutional demand. Specifically, we include the contemporaneous
changes in bonds’ institutional ownership in a Fama-MacBeth return predictability regression,
with the changes in institutional ownership measured over the same time horizon as bond
returns. We find the predictive power of carbon emissions intensity for future bond returns
remains significant, suggesting that shifts in institutional preference toward low carbon assets
cannot fully explain the outperformance of bonds from low carbon emissions firms.
Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2020) propose another potential explanation for
the outperformance of low carbon assets. Their model predicts that assets with a higher
ESG score could earn higher returns if better ESG performance is an indication of strong
firm fundamentals, and the market underreacts to this predictability of fundamentals (the
“investor underreaction” hypothesis). Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms
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with lower carbon emissions intensity are associated with higher future earnings and revenue
surprises, but investors fail to fully incorporate the information they glean from firms’ emission
intensity when forming their expectations about future earnings. As a result, investors are
systematically surprised when fundamental information is subsequently disclosed to the market
via earnings announcements. In further support of this channel, we find firms with low (high)
carbon emissions intensity subsequently experience improved (deteriorating) creditworthiness,
as measured by bond credit ratings and the O-score (Ohlson, 1980). Finally, we show that part
of reason why carbon-intensive firms experience lower cash flows is that environmental risks are
persistent, i.e., carbon-intensive firms are more likely to face negative environment incidents
than carbon-efficient firms. Using data on ESG incidents from RepRisk, we find supporting
evidence that carbon emission intensity is predictive of more frequent environmental incidents
in the future. These results are broadly consistent with the “investor underreaction” hypothesis,
which posits that risk associated with carbon emissions is underpriced in the corporate bond
market.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
describes the data and defines the variables used in our empirical analyses. Section 4 articulates
different hypotheses and associated empirical predictions as motivated by existing theories.
Section 5 presents the main results for the relation between carbon emissions intensity and
cross-sectional bond returns. Section 6 investigates the sources of the low carbon premium in
corporate bonds. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, our paper adds to a fast-
growing climate change finance literature that studies whether financial markets can anticipate
and efficiently discount the long-run risks associated with climate change. Studying this topic
is important because of the key role that financial markets play in alleviating this disaster:
properly pricing climate risks today not only reduces the possibility of wealth transfers between
uninformed and sophisticated agents but also reduces the likelihood of extreme price movements
6
in the future. Evidence to date is still mixed.8 Closely related to our paper, Matsumura,
Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz (2014) show that market valuation is lower for firms with more
carbon emissions, but the voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions helps alleviate that discount.
Painter (2020) documents that the municipal bond market prices climate change risks, especially
for long-term bonds issued by counties more likely to be affected by sea-level rise. Ilhan,
Sautner, and Vilkov (2020) find that uncertainty about climate policy is priced in the options
market. Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020) document that stocks of firms with higher carbon
emissions earn higher returns, although In, Park, and Monk (2019) and Cheema-Fox et al.
(2019) find the opposite evidence: carbon-efficient firms are more profitable and earn higher
returns. Whether return predictability patterns in equities extend to bonds is an open question,
given the markedly different investing clienteles across equities and bonds.
Our study attempts to find some common ground among this mixed evidence by inves-
tigating how the corporate bond market prices carbon risk, and our results have important
consequences for climate mitigation policies and financial stability. A recent paper by Seltzer,
Starks, and Zhu (2020) examines how state-level environmental regulations affect the credit
ratings and yield spreads of corporate bonds. The authors find that firms from the top-polluting
industries tend to have lower credit ratings and higher yield spreads, particularly when the firm
is located in a state with stringent environmental regulations. Our paper differs from theirs,
however, as we focus on firm-level carbon emissions and investigate the pricing of carbon risk
through the lens of expected corporate bond returns.
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the impact of firms’ ESG profiles
on firms’ cost of capital. Existing studies report mixed evidence. Some studies show that
low-ESG assets earn higher expected returns than do high-ESG assets across various contexts,
such as the outperformance of “sin” stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), higher implied cost
capital for firms that derive substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil (Chava, 2014), and
higher expected returns for firms with intense toxic emission (Hsu, Li, and Tsou, 2020). Other
studies uncover opposite results, based on different measures of ESG metrics. Firms’ stocks
8Bansal, Ochoa, and Kiku (2016) find that climate change risk, as proxied for by temperature rise, negatively
affects stock market valuation, implying that markets do price climate change risk. In contrast, Hong, Li, and
Xu (2019) show that global stock markets do not anticipate the effects of worsening droughts on agricultural
firms. In the real estate market, Bernstein, Gustafson, and Lewis (2019) show that home buyers take into
account the negative effect of sea-level rise on real estate prices in coastal areas, although Murfin and Spiegel
(2020) find no evidence of significant valuation effects.
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perform better if the firms themselves are better-governed, have higher employee satisfaction
(Edmans, 2011), strong shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), or higher carbon
efficiency (BlackRock, 2015; In, Park, and Monk, 2019; Cheema-Fox et al., 2019). An emerging
field examines the pricing of securities issued to finance environmentally sustainable projects.
Flammer (2020) documents that the stock market positively responds to the announcement of
green bond issuance as it signals firms’ commitment to protecting the environment. Using a
sample of municipal bonds, however, Larcker and Watts (2020) find no differential pricing of
green and non-green securities issued by the same issuers on the same day. Our study differs
from that line of research by examining the impact of carbon emissions on the much larger
corporate bond market, which institutional investors dominate.
Lastly, this study also contributes to our understanding of the cross-sectional determinants
of corporate bond returns. Despite the multitude of stock and firm characteristics to explain
the cross section of stock returns, far fewer studies are devoted to explaining the expected
returns of corporate bonds.9 Recent studies examine a few corporate bond characteristics
related to default, term, and macroeconomic uncertainty betas (Fama and French, 1993;
Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan, 2005; Bali, Subrahmanyam, and Wen, 2020), liquidity
risk (Lin, Wang, and Wu, 2011), bond momentum (Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel,
2013), downside risk and short-term reversal (Bai, Bali, and Wen, 2019), and long-term reversal
(Bali, Subrahmanyam, and Wen, 2019), all of which exhibit significant explanatory power for
future bond returns. Other papers investigate whether well-known equity market anomalies
affect the cross section of corporate bond returns and find mixed evidence about predictability
(Chordia, Goyal, Nozawa, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2017; Choi and Kim, 2018). Our study
examines whether firms’ carbon emissions intensity (an increasingly important risk factor) is
an incrementally important determinant of corporate bond returns.
3 Data and Variable Definitions
Our study utilizes several datasets including (1) firm-level carbon emissions data, (2) corporate
bond pricing data, and (3) data on institutional holdings of corporate bonds. We provide
9This gap in the literature is partly explained by the dearth of high-quality corporate bond data and the
complex features of corporate bonds, such as optionality, seniority, changing maturity, and risk exposure to a
number of financial and macroeconomic factors.
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detailed descriptions on these datasets below.
3.1 Carbon emissions data
We obtain carbon emissions data from S&P Trucost. Trucost’s firm-level carbon emissions data
follow the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, which sets the standards for measuring carbon emissions.
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol distinguishes between three different sources of emissions: scope
1 emissions, which cover direct emissions from establishments that are owned or controlled
by the firm; these include all emissions from fossil fuel used in production. Scope 2 emissions
originate from purchased heat, steam, and electricity the company consumes. Scope 3 emissions
are generated by the firm’s operations and production but originate from sources not owned
or controlled by the company.10 Trucost reports carbon emissions in units of tons of CO2
equivalents (a standard unit for measuring a firm’s carbon footprint) emitted in a year across
all three scopes. As shown by Busch, Johnson, Pioch, and Kopp (2018), reported scope 1 and
scope 2 emissions data are highly consistent across different data providers.11 Trucost also
reports the CEI for all three scopes, defined as the firm-level greenhouse gas emission in CO2
equivalents, divided by the total revenue of the firm in millions of U.S. dollars. The sample of
carbon emissions data starts from 2005.
To construct our sample, we begin with the universe of all firms in Trucost with a fiscal year
ending between calendar years 2005 and 2017. Since the main firm identifier in Trucost is ISIN,
we first convert ISIN to GVKEY using S&P Capital IQ and then obtain the primary PERMNO
from the Compustat/Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Merged database. Panel
A of Fig. 1 shows the mean carbon emissions intensity (scopes 1, 2, and 3) for the Fama-
French 12 industries from 2005 to 2017. The top-three industries with the highest scope 1
carbon emissions intensity are utilities, energy, and chemicals, respectively.12 Panel B of Fig. 1
presents the average CEI over time and reports a declining trend for scope 1 emissions. This
10The scope 3 data from Trucost is constructed using an input-output model that provides the fraction of
expenditures from one sector across all other sectors of the economy.
11The average correlations for the scope 1 and scope 2 data are 0.99 and 0.98, respectively, across the five
providers (CDP, Trucost, MSCI, Sustainalytics, and Thomson Reuters). However, only two data providers,
Trucost and ISS ESG, estimate scope 3 emissions.
12In Section 5.4, we examine whether our results remain intact after we exclude the top three most carbon-
intensive industries. We find similar results showing that the carbon premium applies to a broader category of
industries, not just carbon-intensive industries.
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result indicates a gradual improvement in carbon efficiency in the average firm’s production
process.
Fig. 2 plots the cross- and within-industry variations in carbon emissions intensity over time.
Panel A of Fig. 2 reports significant cross-industry variation, especially for scope 1 emissions.
The standard deviation of cross-industry CEI declines over time but is of large magnitude
compared to the average CEI as shown in panel B of Fig. 1. More importantly, our CEI
measure exhibits significant cross-sectional variation even within the same industry, as shown
in panel B of Fig. 2. Overall, Fig. 2 shows that carbon emissions intensity intrinsically varies
across industries, and, as a result, we control for the industry effect in our empirical analyses.
3.2 Corporate bond data and bond returns
We compile corporate bond pricing data from the enhanced version of the Trade Reporting
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) for the sample period from 2006 to 2019. We then merge
corporate bond pricing data with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities database to obtain bond
characteristics, such as offering amount, offering date, maturity date, coupon rate, coupon
type, interest payment frequency, bond type, bond rating, bond option features, and issuer
information.
For bond pricing data, we adopt the filtering criteria proposed by Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019).
Specifically, we remove bonds that (a) are not listed or traded in the U.S. public market or
are not issued by U.S. companies; (b) are structured notes, mortgage-backed, asset-backed,
agency-backed, or equity-linked; (c) are convertible; (d) trade under $5 or above $1,000; (e)
have floating coupon rates; and (f) have less than one year to maturity. For intraday data,
we also eliminate bond transactions that (g) are labeled as when-issued, are locked-in, or have
special sales conditions; (h) are canceled, and (i) have a trading volume less than $10,000. From
the original intraday transaction records, we first calculate the daily clean price as the trading
volume-weighted average of intraday prices to minimize the effect of bid-ask spreads in prices,
following Bessembinder et al. (2009).
The corporate bond return in month t is computed as
ri,t =




where Pi,t is the end-of-month transaction price, AIi,t is accrued interest on the same day of
bond prices, and Couponi,t is the coupon payment in month t, if any. The end-of-month price
refers to the last daily observation if there are multiple trading records in the last 10 days of
a given month. Ri,t denotes bond i’s excess return, Ri,t = ri,t − rf,t, where rf,t is the risk-free
rate proxied for by the one-month Treasury-bill rate.
After applying the aforementioned data-filtering criteria, we link the Trucost carbon
emissions data to the bond pricing data set through the linking table using bond CUSIP as the
main identifier. Our sample includes 20,668 bonds issued by 1,178 unique firms, for a total of
1,127,558 bond-month return observations covering the sample period from July 2006 to June
2019. As shown in Table 1, bonds in our sample have an average monthly return of 0.69%,
an average rating of 8 (i.e., BBB+), an average issue size of US$480 million, and an average
time-to-maturity of 9.74 years. The correlation between CEI and other bond characteristics
is low, with the absolute values in the range of 0.01 and 0.09. The sample consists of 76%
investment-grade bonds and 24% high-yield bonds.13
3.3 Corporate bond holdings
To investigate the institutional demand for corporate bonds, we collect the data on institutional
holdings of corporate bonds from Thomson Reuters eMaxx data. This data set comprehensively
covers fixed income holdings from U.S. institutional investors, such as insurance companies,
pension funds, and mutual funds, for the sample period from 2006 to 2019 (the earliest bond
holding data start from 2001). For each bond, we aggregate the shares held by all institutional
investors provided in the data. Specifically, for a given bond i at time t, the measure of












13We collect bond-level rating information from Mergent FISD historical ratings and assign a number to
facilitate the analysis. Specifically, 1 refers to a AAA rating; 2 refers to AA+; ...; and 21 refers to CCC.
Investment-grade bonds have ratings from 1 (AAA) to 10 (BBB-). Non-investment-grade bonds have ratings
above 10. A larger number indicates higher credit risk or lower credit quality. We determine a bond’s rating as
the average of ratings provided by S&P and Moody’s when both are available or as the rating provided by one
of the two rating agencies when only one rating is available.
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where Holdingijt is the par amount holdings of investor j on bond i at time t, OutstandingAmtit
is bond i’s outstanding amount, and hjt is the fraction of the outstanding amount held by
investor j, expressed as a percentage.
3.4 Standard risk factors
We use three different factor models to adjust the risk exposures of CEI-sorted portfolios:
1. A five-factor model with stock market factors, including the excess return on the market
portfolio, proxied for by the value-weighted CRSP index (MKTStock), a size factor (SMB),
a book-to-market factor (HML), a momentum factor (MOMStock), and a liquidity risk factor
(LIQStock), following Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003).
2. A four-factor model with bond market factors, including the aggregate corporate bond
market (MKTBond), the downside risk factor (DRF), the credit risk factor (CRF), and the
liquidity risk factor (LRF), following Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019). The excess bond market
return (MKTBond) is proxied for by the return of the Merrill Lynch Aggregate Bond Market
index in excess of the one-month Treasury-bill rate.14 DRF is the downside risk factor, defined
as the value-weighted average return difference between the highest-VaR portfolio minus the
lowest-VaR portfolio within each rating portfolio. CRF is the credit risk factor, defined as the
value-weighted average return difference between the highest credit risk portfolio minus the
lowest credit risk portfolio within each illiquidity portfolio. LRF is the liquidity risk factor,
defined as the value-weighted average return difference between the highest illiquidity portfolio
minus the lowest illiquidity portfolio within each rating portfolio.
3. A nine-factor model that combines the five stock market factors described in the first
factor model and the four bond market factors described in the second factor model.
14We also consider alternative bond market proxies, such as the Barclays Aggregate Bond index, and the
value-weighted average returns of all corporate bonds in our sample. The results from these alternative bond
market proxies are similar to those reported in our tables.
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4 Hypotheses Development and Empirical Predictions
In this section, we develop different hypotheses based on recent theoretical works linking carbon
risk to asset prices and expected returns (Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2020; Pedersen,
Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski, 2020). We also outline our empirical predictions and approaches
to disentangling the alternative hypotheses.
4.1 Hypothesis development
H1: The carbon risk premium hypothesis: Carbon risk should be positively
priced in the cross section of corporate bond returns if investors with strong ESG
preferences tilt their portfolios more toward green assets and away from those with
high carbon risk. As a result, corporate bonds for firms with higher carbon risk
should earn higher expected returns and vice versa.
Our first hypothesis, H1, is motivated by theoretical work relating carbon risk to asset prices
and returns. Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) present a model of investing based on ESG
criteria and show that green (brown) assets produce negative (positive) alphas.15 Consequently,
the portfolios of agents with stronger ESG preferences tilt more toward green assets and away
from brown assets, and these agents earn lower expected returns. The lower expected returns
from green assets stem from two sources: investors’ tastes for green holdings and such stocks’
ability to hedge against climate risk. Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2020) propose
a theory in which a stock’s ESG score relates to its expected return. In their model, the
carbon premium arises because of exclusionary screening by institutional investors with an
ESG mandate. To the extent that some investors shun companies with high carbon emissions,
risk sharing would be limited, and idiosyncratic risk could be priced (Merton, 1987). If the
extent of such divestment is high, one would expect to find a return premium for bonds issued
by companies with a higher carbon emissions intensity. Overall, both studies show that carbon
risk should be positively priced in asset returns.
A few empirical studies find support for a positive carbon risk premium in the cross section
of various assets. Ilhan, Sautner, and Vilkov (2020) show that carbon-intensive firms exhibit
15This finding is especially true when risk aversion is low and the average ESG preference is strong.
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more tail risk and more variance risk, as reflected in option prices. Bolton and Kacperczyk
(2020) show that investors demand compensation for exposure to carbon risk in the form of
higher returns on firms with a higher level of carbon emissions. Baker, Bergstresser, Serafeim,
and Wurgler (2018) find that green bonds tend to be priced at a premium, offering lower yields
when compared with traditional bonds. Similarly, Chava (2014) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) find
that greener firms have a lower implied cost of capital.
H2: Investor preference hypothesis: Corporate bonds for firms with a low
(high) carbon emissions intensity perform better (worse) than expected if ESG
concerns unexpectedly strengthen.
Our second hypothesis, H2, is motivated by the theoretical work of Pastor, Stambaugh,
and Taylor (2020) and Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2020). For example, Pastor,
Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) show that green and brown assets have opposite ESG factor
exposure. Their model predicts that green assets outperform brown ones during good
performance of the ESG factor, driven by shifts in customers’ tastes for green products and
investors’ tastes for green holdings.16 Both studies argue that if ESG policies make a firm a
safer investment, or if investors non-pecuniarly value ESG, a basic general equilibrium argument
means that high-ESG firms should obtain lower returns than their peers, supporting H1.
However, if investors’ non-pecuniary benefit rises or ESG concerns unexpectedly strengthen,
the situation could lead to a positive abnormal return for high ESG companies (this is the
prediction of H2).
Based on different measures of ESG, some studies find evidence in the stock market
in support of H2. For example, firms’ stocks perform better if the firms themselves are
better-governed, have higher employee satisfaction (Edmans, 2011), strong shareholder rights
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), or higher ESG ratings in the 1992–2004 period (Kempf
and Osthoff, 2007).17 These results are consistent with the aforementioned theoretical works
if ESG concerns unexpectedly strengthened over the sample period. Recent work by In, Park,
and Monk (2019) shows that stocks with low carbon emissions intensity (i.e., “carbon-efficient
16If either kind of ESG concern unexpectedly strengthens over a given period of time, green stocks can
outperform brown stocks over that period, despite having lower alphas in equilibrium.
17Brogger and Kronies (2020) show a positive ESG premium among stocks with high socially unconstrained
ownership (unconstrained investors are mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investment advisors). This
premium is absent for high socially constrained ownership.
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firms”) significantly outperform those with high carbon emissions intensity (i.e., “carbon-
inefficient firms”) by about 3.5%∼5.4% per year post-2010. All of these studies suggest that
low-CEI firms may outperform carbon-intensive firms.
H3: Investor underreaction hypothesis: Carbon emissions intensity may be
predictive of firms’ expected profitability and changes in fundamentals, which can
forecast the expected return of corporate bonds if investors underreact to this
predictability of fundamentals.
Our third hypothesis, H3, is motivated by Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2020), who
show that securities with a high-ESG score could earn higher future returns when investors do
not take into account the predictability of ESG ratings for future firm profitability. The key
ingredients in their model is that the ESG score plays two roles: (1) providing information
about firm fundamentals and (2) affecting investor preferences. A security with a higher ESG
score could have higher expected future profits, which can lead to higher expected returns if the
market underreacts to this predictability of fundamentals. Their model implies that financial
markets may price carbon risk inefficiently.
Indeed, as suggested by Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020), carbon risk may not be fully
integrated by most investors and analysts who tend to ignore unrepresentative information
about global warming and its attendant risks. Consistent with investor underreaction to carbon
risk, Garvey, Iyer, and Nash (2018) and In, Park, and Monk (2019) document a low-carbon
alpha in the stock market; that is, low-CEI stocks outperform carbon-intensive stocks.
4.2 Disentangling alternative hypotheses
To disentangle the above alternative hypotheses from one another, we first examine the
significance of a cross-sectional relation between firms’ CEI and future corporate bond returns
using portfolio-level analysis. As predicted by H1, carbon risk should be positively priced in
the cross section of asset returns if investors with strong ESG preferences tilt their portfolios
more toward green assets and away from those with high carbon risk. As a result, assets
with lower carbon risk should earn lower expected returns. If carbon risk is positively
priced, we should expect the average and risk-adjusted returns on the CEI-sorted portfolios
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to increase monotonically from the lowest-CEI to the highest-CEI quintiles. And the long-
short portfolio should generate a statistically significant and economically meaningful return
spread. Alternatively, if investors’ ESG concerns unexpectedly strengthen or if lower carbon
emissions intensity indicates strong firm fundamentals, the situation could lead to a positive
abnormal return for corporate bonds issued by low-CEI firms. In other words, both H2 and
H3 predict a low carbon premium in the cross section of corporate bonds.
To further distinguish between H2 and H3, we analyze the corporate bond holdings data.
Our analysis allows us to test the asset pricing implications of the investor preference hypothesis
(H2). A number of studies investigate shifts in the demand and preferences of institutional
investors and the ramifications such shifts have on the pricing of stocks (Gompers and Metrick,
2001). Several studies reveal positive correlations between contemporaneous aggregate changes
in institutional ownership and stock returns (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 1999, 2000;
Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003). Motivated by these studies, we examine the relation between
carbon emissions intensity, bond institutional ownership, and bond returns in Sections 6.1 and
6.2.
H3 predicts that investors underreact to the predictability of carbon emissions intensity
for firm fundamentals, as firms with lower carbon emissions intensity may have more efficient
operations, higher expected future profits and lower default risk (Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and
Pomorski, 2020). To test H3, we examine whether investors are indeed positively surprised
by less carbon-intensive firms’ better future performance. We will construct measures such as
earnings (revenue) surprise, earning announcement returns, and changes in credit ratings and
default risks and examine their relation to CEI in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Finally, we explore one
specific channel through which higher CEI translates into lower future firm fundamentals. We
conjecture that a firm’s environmental risk is persistent and carbon-intensive firms are more
likely to face negative environment incidents in the future than carbon efficient firms. We test
the relation between CEI and changes in a firm’s ESG incidents in Section 6.5.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we first perform parametric and nonparametric tests to ascertain the predictive
power of firms’ carbon emissions intensity on the cross section of corporate bond returns. We
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start with univariate portfolio-level analyses presenting the average returns, alphas, and average
bond and firm characteristics of CEI-sorted portfolios. Second, we carry out subsample analyses
for bonds with different credit risks (i.e., investment-grade vs. non-investment-grade bonds) and
different maturities. Third, we present the bond-level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression
results controlling for bond characteristics, systematic risk, and climate change news betas.
Finally, we perform a battery of robustness checks.
5.1 Univariate portfolio analysis
We form quintile portfolios comprising corporate bonds based on the firm-level CEI in June of
each year t for firms with a fiscal year ending in year t− 1. The portfolio returns are calculated
for July of year t to June of year t + 1 and then are rebalanced. The portfolios are value
weighted using the amounts outstanding as weights. Since carbon emissions levels intrinsically
vary across industries, we form portfolios within each of the 12 Fama-French industries to
control for the industry effect and to calculate the average portfolio returns across industries.
Table 2 presents the value-weighted univariate portfolio results. Quintile 1 contains bonds
with the lowest CEI, and quintile 5 consists of bonds with the highest CEI. Table 2 shows,
for each quintile, the average CEI across the bonds, the next month’s value-weighted average
excess return, and the one-month-ahead risk-adjusted returns (alphas) produced from the three
different factor models. The last row displays the differences in the average returns and the
alphas between quintile 5 and quintile 1. The average excess returns and alphas are defined
in terms of monthly percentages. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
The first column in Table 2 shows significant cross-sectional variation in the average values
of carbon emissions intensity when moving from quintile 1 to quintile 5. An increase in the
average CEI from 36.75 (the lowest CEI) to 1, 227.34 (the highest CEI) produces a significant
dispersion of 1,091. Another notable point in Table 2 is that, the next-month’s average excess
return decreases from 0.37% to 0.23% per month, a decrease indicating an economically and
statistically significant monthly average return difference of −0.14% between quintiles 5 and
1 with a t-statistic of −2.62. This result also shows that corporate bonds in the lowest-CEI
quintile generate 1.7% per annum higher returns than do bonds in the highest-CEI quintile.
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In addition to the average excess returns, Table 2 presents the intercepts (alphas) from the
regression of the quintile excess portfolio returns on well-known stock and bond market factors:
the excess stock market return (MKTStock), the size factor (SMB), the book-to-market factor
(HML), the momentum factor (MOM), and the liquidity risk factor (LIQ), following Fama
and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The third column of
Table 2 shows that, similar to the average excess returns, the five-factor alpha on the CEI-sorted
portfolios also decreases from 0.26% to 0.13% per month as we move from the low-CEI quintile
to the high-CEI quintile, indicating a significant alpha difference of −0.13% per month (t-stat.=
−3.13). Beyond the well-known stock market factors, we test whether the significant return
difference between the low- and high-CEI bonds can be explained by the prominent bond market
factors proposed by Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019). The fourth column in Table 2 shows that the
four-factor alpha from the bond market factors decreases monotonically from 0.11% to −0.05%
per month when moving from the low-CEI to the high-CEI quintile. The corresponding four-
factor alpha difference between quintiles 5 and 1 is negative and highly significant at −0.16%
per month with a t-statistic of −2.98. The fifth column in Table 2 presents the nine-factor
alpha for each quintile from the combined five stock and four bond market factors. Consistent
with our earlier results, the nine-factor alpha decreases monotonically from 0.11% to −0.04%
per month when moving from the low-CEI quintile to the high-CEI quintile. This decrease
gives way to a significant alpha difference of −0.15% per month (t-stat. = −3.47).
Next, we investigate the source of the risk-adjusted return difference between low- and high-
CEI portfolios: is it due to outperformance by low-CEI bonds, underperformance by high-CEI
bonds, or both? For this investigation, we focus on the economic and statistical significance
of the risk-adjusted returns of quintile 1 versus quintile 5. As reported in the fifth column
of Table 2, the nine-factor alpha of the bonds in quintile 1 (low-CEI bonds) is positive and
economically and statistically significant, whereas the corresponding alpha of bonds in quintile
5 (high-CEI bonds) is statistically insignificant. Hence, we conclude that the significantly
negative alpha spread between low- and high-CEI bonds is due to outperformance by low-CEI
bonds.
We further examine the average bond characteristics of CEI-sorted portfolios. As shown in
panel B of Table 2, bonds with high CEI (quintile 5) produce a higher market beta and have
higher downside risk, as proxied for by the 5% VaR. In addition, these bonds have lower liquidity,
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have higher credit risk, and are smaller in size. These results suggest that bonds from firms
with high carbon emissions intensity are riskier than those from firms with low carbon emissions
intensity. Yet, as shown in panel A of Table 2, these bonds earn lower future returns. Similar
to the findings in panel B, the results in panel C show that firms with high CEI (i.e., quintile 5)
yield a higher stock market beta and book-to-market ratio, are smaller in size and less liquid,
and are more volatile in terms of stock return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. When we
investigate the accounting fundamentals for firms with higher carbon emissions intensity, panel
D shows that these firms are less profitable (i.e., have lower gross profitability, ROA, ROE, and
operating profitability). Despite having lower debt-to-equity and debt-to-assets ratios, firms
with high CEI have a significantly lower Tobin’s Q and cash-to-assets ratio and, on average,
are two years older than firms with low CEI.
Finally, to better understand the performance of CEI-sorted portfolios during different
subperiods as well as during different economic states, Fig. 3 presents the cumulative monthly
returns of corporate bonds sorted by scope 1 CEI. We calculate the monthly return difference
between the low-CEI portfolio (quintile 1) and the high-CEI portfolio (quintile 5) and then
plot the cumulative returns over the sample period from July 2006 to June 2019. Fig. 3 shows
that bonds issued by firms with low carbon emissions intensity consistently outperform those
with high carbon emissions intensity. Interestingly, the low carbon premium declines for the
most recent subperiod from 2016 to 2019, which corresponds to the post-Paris COP 21 climate
agreement signed in December 2015.18
5.2 Subsample analyses
Although our main results in Table 2 are based on the entire sample of corporate bonds
(including both investment-grade and high-yield bonds), Table 3 presents results for the
univariate portfolios sorted by CEI for investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds
separately. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the return and alpha spreads are economically and
statistically significant for both investment-grade (IG) and non-investment-grade (NIG) bonds.
As expected, the average return and alpha spreads between the low- and high-CEI portfolios are
18One possible interpretation is that investors more efficiently react to the implications of climate risk for
asset value when they become more aware of climate change issues (Painter, 2020). We evaluate this hypothesis
in more detail in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
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larger for NIG bonds, but the return and alpha spreads remain highly significant for IG bonds
as well. In addition, panel B of Table 3 shows that the return and alpha spreads between the
low- and high-CEI bonds are more pronounced in bonds with a longer maturity. For example,
the nine-factor alpha spreads between the low- and high-CEI portfolios are −0.23% (t-stat. =
−3.06) for longer-maturity bonds and −0.13% (t-stat. = −3.02) for shorter-maturity bonds.
This result indicates a more pronounced low carbon premium for bonds with a longer maturity.
5.3 Bond-level Fama-MacBeth regressions
In Section 5.1, we tested the significance of CEI as a cross-sectional determinant of future bond
returns at the portfolio level. We now examine the cross-sectional relation between CEI and
future returns at the bond level using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.19 We present the
time-series averages of the slope coefficients from the regressions of future excess bond returns
on CEI and the control variables, including a number of systematic risk measures and bond
characteristics:
Ri,t+1 = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (3)
where Ri,t+1 is the excess return on bond i from July of year t to June of year t + 1. The
key independent variable is ln(CEIi,t), which is the natural log of firm-level carbon emissions
intensity in June of each year t for firms with a fiscal year ending in year t − 1. The term
Controlsk,t denotes a set of control variables, including (1) bond-level characteristics, such as
the bond market beta (βMKTi,t ), downside risk proxied for by the 5% value-at-risk (V aRi,t),
bond-level illiquidity, credit ratings, years-to-maturity, the bond amount outstanding (size),
and the one-month-lagged bond return; (2) systematic risk proxies, such as the default beta
(βDEFi,t ), the term beta (β
TERM
i,t ), and the macroeconomic uncertainty beta (β
UNC
i,t ) following
Bali, Subrahmanyam, and Wen (2020); and (3) the climate change news beta (βClimatei,t ), which
measures the covariance between corporate bond returns and unexpected changes in climate
19We take the natural log of CEI, which has a highly skewed distribution.
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change news index following Huynh and Xia (2020).20 To account for systematic differences
in carbon emissions across industries, we also control for the Fama-French 12 industry fixed
effects in all specifications. This step is consistent with that taken in our univariate portfolio
analysis.
Table 4 reports the time-series average of the intercepts, the slope coefficients (λs), and the
adjusted R2 values over the 156 months from July 2006 to June 2019. Newey-West-adjusted
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The univariate regression results reveal a negative and
significant relation between CEI and the cross section of future bond returns. In Regression
(1), the average slope λ1,t from the monthly regressions of excess returns on ln(CEI) alone is
−0.046 with a t-statistic of −2.76. The economic magnitude of the associated effect is similar
to that shown in Table 2 for the univariate quintile portfolios of CEI. The spread in the average
ln(CEI) between quintiles 5 and 1 is approximately 3.42, and multiplying this spread by the
average slope of −0.046 yields an estimated monthly return difference of 16 basis points (bps).21
Regression specification (2) in Table 4 shows that after we control for market risk (βBond),
downside risk, illiquidity, credit ratings, maturity, size, and the previous month’s bond return,
the average slope coefficient for ln(CEI) remains negative and highly significant. In other
words, controlling for bond characteristics does not affect the significance of carbon emissions
intensity in the corporate bond market.
Regression (3) tests the cross-sectional predictive power of CEI, while controlling for other
systematic risk measures, namely, the default beta, the term beta, and the macroeconomic
uncertainty beta. In addition, we control for the climate change news beta in Huynh and Xia
(2020), who show that shocks to the climate change news index is priced in corporate bonds. In
particular, they show that corporate bonds with a higher climate change news beta earns lower
future returns, consistent with the asset pricing implications of excess demand for bonds with
the potential to hedge against climate risk. Consistent with Bali, Subrahmanyam, and Wen
20Following their study, we estimate the exposure of individual bonds to the climate change news index based
on monthly rolling regressions using a 36-month fixed window estimation. We require at least 24 months of
return observations to construct the climate change news beta (βClimatei,t ). We find that the correlation between
ln(CEI) and βClimate is quite low at −0.04, indicating a significant difference between a firm’s carbon emissions
intensity and the climate change news beta which measures the bonds’ ability to hedge against climate change
news risk.
21Note that the ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology used in the Fama-MacBeth regressions equally
weights each cross-sectional observation so that the regression results are more aligned with the equal-weighted
portfolios. Thus, the CEI obtained from the Fama-MacBeth regressions, 0.16% per month, is somewhat higher
than the 0.14% per month obtained from the value-weighted portfolios (see Table 2).
21
(2020), Regression (3) shows a significantly negative relation between the bond macroeconomic
uncertainty beta (βUNC) and future bond returns. The average slope on βUNC is economically
and statistically significant at −0.134 (t-statistic = −2.98). Importantly, the average slope
coefficient for ln(CEI) remains negative and highly significant, −0.038 (t-stat. = −2.56),
indicating that exposures to systematic risk or climate change news index do not explain the
predictive power of carbon emissions intensity for future bond returns.
The last specification, Regression (4), controls for all bond return characteristics, systematic
risk, and climate change news betas. Similar to our findings in Regression (1), the cross-sectional
relation between future bond returns and CEI is negative and highly significant. The negative
average slope of −0.036 for ln(CEI) in Regression (5) represents an economically significant
effect of 0.12% per month between the top and bottom quintiles, controlling for everything
else. These results show that our carbon emissions intensity measure carries distinct, significant
information beyond information about bond size, maturity, rating, liquidity, market risk, default
risk, and climate change news risk. Thus, carbon emissions intensity is a strong and robust
predictor of future bond returns.
5.4 Robustness checks
5.4.1 Different categories of carbon emission
Our results so far use a firm’s scope 1 carbon emissions scaled by total revenue as the main
measure of carbon emissions intensity. As is shown by Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020), the data
on scope 1 and scope 2 emissions are widely reported. Scope 3 emissions, on the other hand,
are estimated using an input-output matrix and have only been reported by companies as of
recently. As a result, in this section, we examine whether our main results hold using a different
category of carbon emissions based on scope 2 emissions scaled by total revenue as the main
measure of carbon emissions intensity. In addition, we combine scope 1 and scope 2 emissions
to generate a broader category measure of carbon emissions intensity, Total Scope, defined as
below:
Total Scope =




Panel A of Table 5 shows that our main findings remain similar when we use different
categories of carbon emissions. The average return and nine-factor alpha spreads between low-
and high-CEI bonds are −0.12% (t-stat. = −1.90) and −0.15% (t-stat. = −3.04), respectively,
when we use a firm’s scope 2 carbon emissions as the main measure of carbon emissions intensity.
Moreover, panel A shows economically and statistically significant returns and alpha spreads
when we combine both scope 1 and scope 2 carbon emissions (Total Scope), indicating a
significant relation between the broader measure of carbon emissions intensity and future bond
returns.
5.4.2 Excluding the most carbon-intensive industries
Carbon emissions levels intrinsically vary across industries, and we control for industry
effects when forming portfolios in Section 5.1 and in the cross-sectional regression analyses
in Section 5.3. In this section, we further investigate whether our results remain intact when
we exclude the most carbon-intensive industries that could drive the main results. For instance,
firms in the energy, chemical, or utility industry are highly likely to be carbon-intensive
compared to firms in other industries. To investigate whether the carbon premium applies to
a broader category, not just carbon-intensive industries, we exclude carbon-intensive industries
one by one and then all together.
Panel B of Table 5 shows that the most carbon-intensive industries do not drive our main
results, rather they are driven by a broader category of industries. Specifically, the nine-
factor alpha spreads between low- and high-CEI bonds remain economically and statistically
significant and are −0.09% (t-stat. = −2.78), −0.14% (t-stat. = −3.57), and −0.14% (t-stat.
= −3.59), respectively, when we exclude the energy, chemical, or utilities industry one by
one. Moreover, when we exclude all three carbon-intensive industries, the average return and
nine-factor alpha spreads between low- and high-CEI bonds are −0.11% (t-stat. = −2.39) and




Our empirical analyses thus far have been based on bond-level data since we test whether
the carbon emissions intensity of a firm predicts the firm’s future bond returns. One concern
is that firms with large numbers of distinct bond issues can have a material impact on the
cross-sectional relations that we are testing. In this section, we use three different approaches
to control for the effect of multiple bonds issued by the same firm by (1) forming the value-
weighted average of the bond returns across the same firm and (2) picking the largest bond
or the most-liquid bond as representative of the firm to replicate our portfolio-level analysis
using this firm-level data set. Panel C of Table 5 presents the value-weighted quintile portfolios,
which indicate significant returns and alpha differences in the cross section of firm-level bond
returns. Specifically, the value-weighted average return and nine-factor alpha spreads between
low-CEI and high-CEI firms are −0.10% (t-stat. = −2.78) and −0.12% (t-statistic = −2.93),
respectively. In panel C when the largest or the most-liquid bond is chosen as the representative
of the firm, the return effect remains highly significant.
5.4.4 Subperiod analyses
We examine whether our finding is robust across different subperiods. First, we estimate the
carbon premium after excluding the period of the financial crisis, which we define as September
2008 to December 2009. Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) find that high-corporate-social-
responsibility (CSR) firms reported significantly better stock and operating performance than
do low-CSR firms during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Carbon emissions is an important
component of firms’ ESG rating, so the outperformance of low-CEI bonds could be concentrated
in the crisis period. Panel D of Table 5 shows that the average return and alpha spreads between
the low- and high-CEI portfolios are, respectively, −0.14% per month (t-stat. = −2.21) and
−0.12% per month (t-stat. = −3.17), indicating that excluding the crisis period does not affect
our results.
Second, we investigate the carbon premium for the two subperiods based on a six-year
interval: (a) the first precrisis subperiod from July 2006 to June 2013 and (b) the most recent
subperiod from July 2013 to June 2019. Panel D of Table 5 shows the effect is stronger for the
first subperiod; the average return and alpha spreads between the low- and high-CEI portfolios
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are, respectively, −0.18% per month (t-stat. = −2.06) and −0.16% per month (t-stat. =
−2.46). The carbon premium has a weaker economic significance for the second subperiod but
remains statistically significant; the average return and alpha spreads between the low- and
high-CEI portfolios are, respectively, −0.11% per month (t-stat. = −1.96) and −0.10% per
month (t-stat. = −2.48).
6 Sources of Low Carbon Premium
The return predictability results in Section 5 show that bonds from firms with low CEI
outperform firms with high CEI. This result, combined with the evidence that bonds from high-
emissions firms are riskier than those from low-emissions firms, indicates that H1 (the “carbon
risk premium” hypothesis) is not supported.22 H1 is a risk-based explanation that predicts
a stronger pricing effect among non-investment-grade (NIG) bonds than among investment-
grade (IG) bonds, as an unexpected deterioration in firms’ fundamentals will push such bonds
closer to default. In addition, since climate risks will likely materialize over the long run, we
expect to find a stronger pricing effect for carbon emissions intensity on corporate bonds with
a longer time to maturity based on H1. However, although the results in Section 5.2 show a
more pronounced carbon premium for NIG bonds with a longer maturity, the return and alpha
spreads between the low- and high-CEI bonds are driven by the outperformance of low-CEI
bonds, contrary to the prediction of H1.
On the other hand, H2 (the “investor preference” hypothesis) predicts that green firms
could outperform brown firms if investors’ preferences for ESG unexpectedly strengthens over
the sample period. We rely on the corporate bond institutional holdings to test the asset pricing
implications of the investor preference hypothesis in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Finally, carbon emissions intensity can be predictive of firms’ expected profitability and
changes in fundamentals, which can affect the expected return of corporate bonds if investors
underreact to this predictability of fundamentals (Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski, 2020).
To test this “investor underreaction” hypothesis (H3), we examine whether investors are
22The prediction in H1 is that bonds issued by carbon-intensive firms are riskier because such bonds are more
likely to lose value when climate policies become more stringent and consumers shift to green firms, affecting
the profitability and solvency of brown firms.
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positively surprised by the better future performance of low-CEI firms in Sections 6.3 and
6.4. Moreover, we explore one specific channel through which higher CEI translates into lower
firm fundamentals and investigate the relation between CEI and a firm’s future environmental
incidents in Section 6.5.
6.1 Carbon emissions intensity and corporate bond institutional
ownership
The investor preference hypothesis (H2) predicts that corporate bonds for firms with low (high)
carbon emissions intensity perform better (worse) than expected if ESG concerns unexpectedly
strengthen (Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2020; Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski, 2020).
Based on a survey about individuals’ climate risk perceptions, Krueger, Sautner, and Starks
(2020) show that institutional investors believe climate risks have financial consequences for
their portfolio firms and that climate risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun
to materialize. To test this hypothesis, we rely on Thomson Reuter’s eMAXX corporate bond
holdings data.
We first examine the cross-sectional relation between CEI and changes in institutional
ownership using cross-sectional regressions. We present the time-series averages of the slope
coefficients from the regressions of changes in institutional ownership on CEI and the control
variables, including a number of systematic risk measures and bond characteristics:
∆INST Bondi,t+1 = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (5)
where the dependent variable is the change in bonds’ institutional ownership (∆INST Bond),
defined as the institutional ownership in June of year t+ 1 minus the institutional ownership in
June of year t. The key independent variable is ln(CEIi,t), which is the natural log of firm-level
carbon emissions intensity in June of each year t, for firms with a fiscal year ending in year t−1.
The term Controlsk,t denotes a set of control variables, including bond-level characteristics,
such as the bond market beta (βMKTi,t ), downside risk, bond-level illiquidity, credit ratings,
years-to-maturity, the bond amount outstanding (size), and the past six-month cumulative
bond returns (Rt−7:t−2). We also include additional controls related to systematic and climate
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risk proxies, such as the default beta (βDEFi,t ), the term beta (β
TERM
i,t ), the macroeconomic
uncertainty beta (βUNCi,t ), and the climate change news beta (β
Climate
i,t ). To better interpret
their economic significance, we standardize all independent variables in the cross section to
have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of changes in bonds’ institutional ownership. Regression
(1) of panel A shows a negative and significant relation between CEI and changes in bonds’
institutional ownership. The average slope λ1,t for ln(CEI) alone is −0.471 with a t-statistic of
−3.66, implying a one-standard-deviation increase in ln(CEI) is associated with a 0.471%
decrease in bonds’ institutional ownership. This economic magnitude is translated into a
26.5% decrease in ∆INST Bond given the average ∆INST Bond in our bond sample is 1.77%.
Regression specification (2) in panel A shows that after we control for market risk (βBond),
downside risk, illiquidity, credit ratings, maturity, size, and past six-month cumulative bond
return, the average slope coefficient for CEI remains negative and highly significant.
Regression (3) in panel A of Table 6 tests the cross-sectional predictive power of CEI,
while controlling for exposures to other systematic/climate change news risks. Importantly, the
average slope coefficient for ln(CEI) remains negative and highly significant, −0.489 (t-stat.
= −4.51), indicating that systematic risk or climate change news betas do not explain the
predictive power of carbon emissions intensity for changes in institutional ownership. The last
specification, Regression (4), controls for all bond return characteristics, systematic risk, and
climate change news beta. Similar to our findings in Regression (1), the cross-sectional relation
between ∆INST Bond and CEI is negative and highly significant. The negative average slope
of −0.226 on ln(CEI) in Regression (4) represents a 12.6% decrease in ∆INST Bond relative
to the average bond’s institutional ownership, controlling for everything else.
6.2 Do changes in institutional ownership fully explain the low
carbon premium?
The results in panel A of Table 6 suggest that institutional investors divest from bonds
with high carbon emissions intensity. However, whether divestment by a few institutions can
generate sufficient pricing effects on bonds from carbon-intensive firms is unclear. To further
investigate how ownership changes affect future bond returns, we examine whether the low
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returns associated with high-CEI bonds (i.e., the findings in Table 4) can be fully explained by
changes in institutional ownership through the divestment channel. Specifically, we replicate
Table 4 in panel B of Table 6, where we include additional controls for the contemporaneous
changes in bonds’ institutional ownership (∆INST Bond),
Ri,t+1 = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) + λ2,t · ∆INST Bondi,t+1 +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (6)
where Ri,t+1 is the corporate bond excess return from July of year t to June of year t + 1. ∆
INST Bondi,t+1 denotes contemporaneous changes in bonds’ institutional ownership measured
over the same time horizon as the dependent variable bond returns. We include the same set
of control variables, Controlsk,t, used in Table 4. If changes in bonds’ institutional ownership
fully explain the high (low) returns associated with low- (high-)CEI bonds, then we should
expect that ln(CEI) loses its predictive power for future bond returns once we control for
∆INST Bond.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficients for ln(CEI) remain significantly negative for
all specifications. After controlling for changes in institutional ownership, bond characteristics
and systematic/climate change news betas, regression (4) shows a coefficient of −0.027 (t-stat.
= −2.15) for carbon emissions intensity, indicating that ∆INST Bond cannot fully explain the
outperformance of low-CEI bonds shown in Table 4. The coefficient of −0.027 for ln(CEI) in
panel B of Table 6 is smaller than that of Table 4, −0.036 in regression (4), representing
a 25% reduction in the return spread once ∆INST Bond is controlled for. However, the
predictive power of carbon emissions intensity for future bond returns remains economically and
statistically significant. In addition, panel B of Table 6 shows that although the coefficients for
∆INST Bond are positive, none of them is significant, and the adjusted R-squared’s are similar
to those in Table 4, indicating that shifts in institutional demand do not have significant pricing
impacts on corporate bonds.
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6.3 Carbon emissions intensity and cash flow surprises
Finally, we examine whether the low carbon alpha in the bond market could be explained
by investors underreacting to the predictability of CEI for firm fundamentals (H3). If this
is the underlying channel, we expect that a firm’s carbon emissions intensity negatively
predicts its future fundamental performance, and investors are systematically surprised when
the fundamental information is disclosed to the market. We use earnings and revenue surprise
as measures of firm fundamental news to test this hypothesis.
Our first proxy for cash flow surprises is standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). SUE
is defined as the change of quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) from four quarters ago divided
by the standard deviation of this change in quarterly earnings over the prior eight quarters.
In our setting, we examine the predictability of carbon emissions intensity for future earnings
surprises using SUE as the dependent variable and CEI as the primary explanatory variable.
Specifically, we use the following regression specification:
SUEi,t+1 = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (7)
where SUEi,t+1 is the standardized unexpected earnings of firm i over the period of July of
year t to June of year t + 1. The key independent variable is ln(CEIi,t), the natural log of
firm-level carbon emissions intensity in June of each year t, for firms with a fiscal year ending
in year t − 1. Controlk,t denotes a set of control variables, including a one-quarter-lagged
dependent variable, a four-quarter-lagged dependent variable, firm size, the book-to-market
ratio, return-on-equity (ROE), R&D intensity (R&D), investment, operating cash flows (OCF),
institutional ownership, and momentum. We also include industry and/or quarter fixed effects
in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
7 report the regression results. The coefficient for ln(CEI) is significantly negative for both
specifications. With industry and quarter fixed effects in column 2, the coefficient for ln(CEI)
is −0.0128 (t-stat. = −2.19), indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in ln(CEI)
leads to a 0.0312 (=0.0128 × 2.4389) lower SUE, which is economically meaningful compared
to the mean SUE of 0.2016.
We use the standardized unexpected revenue growth estimator (SURGE) as an alternative
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measure of firm fundamental news (Jegadeesh and Livnat, 2006). SURGE is defined as the
change in revenue per share from its value four quarters ago divided by the standard deviation
of this change in quarterly revenue per share over the prior eight quarters. We use the same
specification used in Equation 7, except we replace SUE with SURGE, and use the same set of
control variables. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 report the regression results. The coefficients for
ln(CEI) are significantly negative, suggesting that more carbon-intensive firms subsequently
have lower revenue growth.
To test whether investors underreact to the predictability of CEI for future cash flow
surprises, we examine market reactions around earnings announcements. We extract quarterly
earnings announcement dates from Compustat and calculate the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR(−2, +1)) in a four-day window around the earnings announcements, with abnormal
returns defined as raw stock returns adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted index return. We
use the same specification used in Equation 7, except we replace SUE with CAR(−2, +1),
and use the same set of control variables. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 report the regression
results. The coefficients for ln(CEI) are significantly negative for both specifications. With
industry and quarter fixed effects in column 6, the economic magnitude suggests that a one-
standard-deviation increase in ln(CEI) leads to a 5-bps lower market reaction around earnings
announcements.
Overall, our finding that firms with higher carbon emissions intensity have lower earnings
(revenue) surprise and a more negative market reaction suggests that investors fail to unravel
the information contained in firms’ carbon emissions intensity when forming expectations about
future earnings. As a result, investors are systematically surprised when fundamental news is
subsequently disclosed to the market via earnings announcements. Since bonds are a claim on
issuers’ future cash flows and assets, investors underreaction to the predictive power of CEI for
firm performance may well explain the underperformance of high-CEI bonds.
6.4 Carbon emissions intensity and firms’ creditworthiness
In Section 6.3, we show that firms with a low- (high-)CEI are associated with subsequent
better (worse) performance. Improved firm fundamentals should naturally lead to higher
creditworthiness for the firm, and higher creditworthiness should then drive the higher realized
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bond returns for low-CEI firms. We test this prediction by examining the relation between CEI
and subsequent changes in bond credit ratings. Specifically, our dependent variable of interest
is the change in bond credit rating (∆Rating), and our key explanatory variable is CEI at the
firm level. Our regression specification is
∆Ratingi,t+1 = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (8)
where ∆Ratingi,t+1 is the credit rating of bond i in June of year t + 1 minus its credit rating
in June of year t. Ratings are in conventional numerical scores, where 1 refers to an AAA
rating and 21 refers to a C rating. A higher numerical score implies higher credit risk. The key
independent variable is ln(CEIi,t), the natural log of firm-level carbon emissions intensity in
June of each year t, for firms with a fiscal year ending in year t− 1. Controlk,t denotes control
variables, including firm size, the book-to-market ratio, return-on-equity (ROE), R&D intensity
(R&D), investment, operating cash flows (OCF), and institutional ownership. We also include
bond and year fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the firm level. Column 1 of Table
8 shows that the coefficients for ln(CEI) are significantly positive, indicating that a firm with
low carbon emissions intensity improves its credit rating on its bonds over the next year.
In addition to bond credit ratings, we construct Ohlson (1980)’s O-score as an alternative
proxy of firm creditworthiness. A higher O-score represents a higher probability of financial
distress and lower firm creditworthiness. We use the same specification used in Equation 8,
except we replace ∆Ratingi,t+1 with the change in firm-level O-score, and use the same set of
control variables. Specifically, the dependent variable ∆O Scorei,t+1 is the O-score of firm i
in June of year t + 1 minus its most recent quarter O-score before June of year t. Column 2
of Table 8 reports the results. Consistent with the results on credit rating changes, we find
that firms with low (high) carbon emissions intensity experience a reduction (increase) in their
probability of financial distress in the future. Overall, these results provide strong evidence
that the source of the low carbon premium arises from the predictability of CEI for a change
in firm creditworthiness.
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6.5 Carbon emissions intensity and environmental incidents
Our results so far suggest that firms with higher carbon emissions intensity have more negative
cash flow surprises and deteriorating creditworthiness in the future. In this section, we explore
one specific channel through which higher CEI translates into lower future firm fundamentals.
Our conjecture is that a firm’s environmental risk is persistent and carbon-intensive firms are
more likely to face negative environment incidents in the future than carbon efficient firms. If
investors are not aware of or fully react to these firms’ persistently high environmental risks,
carbon-intensive firms should experience negative cash flow news and lower future bond returns.
To analyze the persistency in a firm’s environment risks, we obtain the data on ESG incidents
from RepRisk, a Zurich-based provider of ESG data. RepRisk uses a rigorous process to identify
and rate negative ESG incidents, using information from over 80,000 sources on firm incidents
that are related to one of the 28 predefined ESG incidents.23 The incident is quantified by the
RepRisk Index, a proprietary algorithm, which measures the ESG-related risk exposure of a
firm. The RepRisk index ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating a higher ESG
risk exposure. The RepRisk index of a firm increases whenever the firm is associated with an
ESG incident, and the relative increase depends on the severity, the reach, and the novelty of
the incident and on the intensity of the news about the incident. One important advantage
of the RepRisk index is that it is constructed using realized ESG incidents that are identified
by systematically searching through the news, and hence is less subjective and less prone to
manipulation by firms (Gloßner, 2018).
We test our prediction by examining the relation between CEI and the frequency of a firm’s
ESG incidents over the next year. Specifically, we calculate the sum of all the positively changes
in the RepRisk Index within a year, where each positive change indicates an ESG incident.
To ensure we capture a firm’s environmental incidents rather than the S and G aspects of the
RepRisk Index, we require the percentage of environmental issues used to compute the RepRisk
23These sources include print and online media (including local, national, and international media), NGOs,
government agencies, think tanks, social media, along with many others. To screen these sources, RepRisk uses
a variety of artificial intelligence tools, such as advanced search algorithms, semantic web-tools, or web-crawls.
Second, every identified incident is checked by a 1st-level RepRisk analyst who ensures that the incident is
ESG-related, meets a severity threshold, and is not a duplicate of an older incident. Third, the incident is
analyzed by a 2nd-level RepRisk analyst who considers the severity of the incident, the reach of the information
source, and the novelty of the incident. Fourth, every incident undergoes a quality review by a RepRisk senior
analyst who ensures that the second and third steps are processed according to RepRisk’s rules.
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Index is greater than 50%. Our regression specification is
Ln(1 + Incidentsi,t+1) = λ0,t + λ1,t · ln(CEIi,t) +
K∑
k=1
λk,tControlk,t + εi,t+1, (9)
where Incidentsi,t+1 is the sum of all positive changes in the RepRisk Index of firm i from June
of year t to June of year t+ 1. We take the natural log of the variable Incidents because it is
highly skewed to the right. As a result, the variable Ln(1 + Incidentsi,t+1) has a value of zero
when firm i has no ESG incidents in that period. The key independent variable is ln(CEIi,t), the
natural log of firm-level carbon emissions intensity in June of each year t, for firms with a fiscal
year ending in year t − 1. Controlk,t denotes the same set of control variables, including size,
book-to-market ratio, return-on-equity (ROE), R&D intensity (R&D), investment, operating
cash flows (OCF), and institutional ownership. We also include industry and/or year fixed
effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Table 9 shows the regression results. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on ln(CEI) is
0.16 with a highly significant t-statistic of 15.90, indicating that high-CEI firms experience more
environmental incidents in the next year than low-CEI firms do. Multiplying the coefficient on
ln(CEI) with the spread in the average ln(CEI) between quintiles 5 and 1 in Table 2 yields
an estimated difference of 0.547 (=0.16×3.42). As a result, the economic significance shows
that high-CEI firms (quintile 5) have RepRisk Index 54.7% higher than low-CEI firms (quintile
1) over the following year. In column 2, we control for industry fixed effects and find similar
results. Overall, the results support our conjecture that carbon-intensive firms have persistently
high environment risk exposures, which subsequently manifest in more frequent environmental
incidents, poorer fundamentals, and deteriorating creditworthiness.
7 Conclusion
Despite the immense literature on the effects of climate risk on the expected returns of equities,
far fewer studies are devoted to understanding the role of climate risk in the expected returns
of corporate bonds. Our paper is one of first in the literature to explore whether a firm’s carbon
risk, as measured by its carbon emissions intensity, is priced in the cross section of corporate
bond returns. Contrary to the “carbon risk premium” hypothesis, we find that bonds of firms
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with higher carbon emissions intensity earn significantly lower future returns. The effect cannot
be explained by other bond or firm characteristics or by exposure to known stock or bond risk
factors.
Examining the sources of return predictability, we find the underperformance of bonds
issued by carbon-intensive firms cannot be fully explained by divestment from institutional
investors. Instead, our evidence is most consistent with investors underreacting to carbon risk
in the corporate bond market, as carbon emissions intensity is predictive of lower future cash
flow surprises, deteriorating firm creditworthiness, and more frequent negative environment
incidents. Given the growing bond issuance by corporations and increasing flows to bond funds
by households, the inefficient pricing of carbon emissions in the corporate bond market has





Carbon emissions intensity (scope 1) Scope 1 emissions divided by the firm’s revenue (unit: tCO2e/$million). Scope 1 emissions are greenhouse gas emissions
generated from burning fossil fuels and production processes which are owned or controlled by the company (unit:
tCO2e).
Carbon emissions intensity (scope 2) Scope 2 emissions divided by the firm’s revenue (unit: tCO2e/$million). Scope 2 emissions are greenhouse gas emissions
from consumption of purchased electricity, heat or steam by the company (unit: tCO2e).
Carbon emissions intensity (scope 3) Scope 3 emissions dvided by the firm’s revenue (unit: tCO2e/$million). Scope 3 emissions are other indirect emissions
from the production of purchased materials, product use, waste disposal, outsourced activities, etc. (unit: tCO2e).
ln(CEI) The natural logarithm of carbon emissions intensity (scope 1).
Corporate Bond Variables
βBond The bond market beta is estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of individual bond excess returns
on the bond market excess returns (MKTBond) using a 36-month rolling window. MKTBond is the aggregate bond
market portfolio, proxied by the Merrill Lynch U.S. Aggregate Bond Index.
Downside risk Downside risk is the 5% Value-at-Risk (VaR) of corporate bond return, defined as the second lowest monthly return
observation over the past 36 months. The original VaR measure is multiplied by −1 so that a higher VaR indicates
higher downside risk.
ILLIQ Bond illiquidity is computed as the autocovariance of the daily price changes within each month, multiplied by −1.
Rating Raings are in conventional numerical scores, where 1 refers to an AAA rating and 21 refers to a C rating. Higher
numerical score means higher credit risk. Numerical ratings of 10 or below (BBB- or better) are considered investment
grade, and ratings of 11 or higher (BB + or worse) are labeled high yield.
∆Rating The bond credit rating in June of year t+ 1 minus the bond credit rating in June of year t.
Maturity The time to maturity (years) for the bond.
Size The total amount outstanding for the bond (Size, $ billion).
Lag Return The holding period bond return in the previous month t− 1.
Return(t−7:t−2) The cumulative holding period bond returns from month t− 7 to month t− 2.
βDEF The default risk beta is estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of individual bond excess returns
on the default factor (DEF) using a 36-month rolling window, after controlling for the bond market excess return
(MKTBond) and the term factor (TERM).
βTERM The term risk beta is estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of individual bond excess returns on the
term factor (TERM) using a 36-month rolling window, after controlling for the bond market excess return (MKTBond)
and the default factor (DEF).
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Variables Description
βUNC The macroeconomic uncertainty risk beta is estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of individual bond
excess returns on the macroeconomic uncertainty factor (UNC) using a 36-month rolling window, after controlling for the
bond market excess return (MKTBond).
βClimate The climate change news beta is estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of individual bond excess returns
on the climate change news index (Climate) using a 36-month rolling window, after controlling for the bond market excess
return (MKTBond).
∆INST Bond The bond institutional ownership in June of year t+ 1 minus the bond institutional ownership in June of year t. The bond
institutional ownership is the fraction of the outstanding amount held by institutions in percentage.
Firm Variables
βStock The bond market beta is estimated for each stock from the time-series regressions of individual stock excess returns on the
CRSP value-weighted market index excess returns using a 36-month rolling window.
Firm size The natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June.
BM The book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1 divided by the market equity at the end of December of
year t− 1. The book equity is the book value of stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax
credit if available, minus the book value of preferred stock.
MOM The cumulative holding period stock returns from month t − 12 to t − 2 preceding the quarterly earnings announcement
month.
Amihud Amihud Illiquidity measure, calculated as the absolute price change scaled by the volume.
VOL The stock return volatility based on the past 60 monthly returns.
IVOL The idiosyncratic volatility based on the Fama-French 3 factor model using the past 60 monthly returns.
INST Stock The number of shares held by institutions from 13F filings divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the end of
December.
Gross profit/Assets Gorss profit divided by total assets.
ROA Operating income before depreciation as a fraction of average total assets based on most recent two periods.
ROE Income before extraordinary items divided by average book value of equity.
Operating profit/Assets Operating profit divided by total assets.
Debt/Equity ratio Total debt divided by the book value of equity.
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of assets (market cap of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of assets.
Cash/Assets Cash holdings divided by total assets.
Age The number of years since the IPO year.
SUE The change in split-adjusted quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters ago divided by the standard deviation
of this change over the prior eight quarters (four quarters minimum).
SURGE The change in revenue per share from its value four quarters ago divided by the standard deviation of this change over the
prior eight quarters (four quarters minimum).
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Variables Description
CAR(−2,+1) Four-day cumulative abnormal return from two days before to one day after the earning announcement day (day 0), where daily
abnormal return is the difference between daily stock return and the CRSP value-weighted market index return.
R&D R&D expenditures divided by sales.
Investment The annual growth in total assets.
OCF The operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets.
∆O Score The one-year ahead change of O-Score relative to the most recent quarter before June of year t.
Incidents The sum of all positive changes in the RepRisk Index for a firm from June of year t to June of year t + 1. A higher index
number indicates a higher ESG risk exposure and each positive change represents an ESG incident. To ensure we capture a firm’s
environmental incidents rather than the S and G aspects of the RepRisk Index, we require the percentage of environmental issues
used to compute the RepRisk Index is greater than 50%.
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Figure 1. Carbon Emissions Intensity
Panel A: Average Carbon Emissions Intensity by Fama-French 12 Industries
Panel B: Average Carbon Emissions Intensity over time
The top panel of the figure depicts the average carbon emissions intensity (CEI) by Fama-French 12
industries based on the Trucost dataset. The bottom panel depicts the average CEI over time. The
sample period is from 2005 to 2017.
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Figure 2. Cross and Within-Industry Variation in Carbon Emissions Intensity
Panel A: Cross-Industry Standard Deviation in Carbon Emissions Intensity
Panel B: Average Within-Industry Standard Deviation in Carbon Emissions Intensity
The figure depicts the cross-industry (within-industry) standard deviations in carbon emissions intensity
over time based on the Trucost dataset. The sample period is from 2005 to 2017.
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Figure 3. Cumulative Return for the Carbon Emissions Intensity Sorted Portfolio
The figure plots the cumulative monthly returns of corporate bonds sorted by the firm-level scope 1
carbon emissions intensity (CEI), defined as the greenhouse gas emission in CO2 equivalents, divided
by the total revenue of the firm in millions of dollars. Scope 1 carbon emissions are the greenhouse gas
emissions generated from burning fossil fuels and production processes which are owned or controlled
by the company. We calculate the monthly return difference between the low-CEI portfolio (Quintile
1) and the high-CEI portfolio (Quintile 5) and then plot the cumulative returns over the sample period
from July 2006 to June 2019.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Panel A reports the number of bond-month observations, the cross-sectional mean, median, standard deviation and percentiles for corporate bond monthly
returns and bond characteristics including credit rating, time-to-maturity (Maturity, year), amount outstanding (Size, $ billion), bond market beta
(βBond), downside risk (5% Value-at-Risk, VaR), and illiquidity (ILLIQ). Carbon emissions intensity (CEI) is defined as the firm-level scope 1 greenhouse
gas emissions in CO2 equivalents generated from burning fossil fuels and production processes which are owned or controlled by the company, divided by
the total revenue of the firm in millions of dollars. Ratings are in conventional numerical scores, where 1 refers to an AAA rating and 21 refers to a C
rating. Higher numerical score means higher credit risk. Numerical ratings of 10 or below (BBB- or better) are considered investment grade. βBond is the
individual bond exposure to the aggregate bond market portfolio (MKTBond), proxied by the Merrill Lynch U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. Downside risk
is the 5% Value-at-Risk (VaR) of corporate bond return, defined as the second lowest monthly return observation over the past 36 months. The original
VaR measure is multiplied by −1 so that a higher VaR indicates higher downside risk. Bond illiquidity is computed as the autocovariance of the daily
price changes within each month, multiplied by −1. Panel B reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional correlations. The sample period is from
July 2006 to June 2019.
Panel A: Cross-sectional statistics over the sample period of July 2006 – June 2019
Percentiles
N Mean Median SD 1st 5th 25th 75th 95th 99th
Bond return (%) 1,127,558 0.69 0.48 3.93 -8.41 -4.05 -0.72 1.85 6.15 11.95
Carbon emissions intensity (CEI) 736,904 444.91 10.89 1205.74 0.31 0.42 1.17 89.16 3813.54 5320.97
Rating 1,113,082 8.46 7.82 3.79 1.77 2.84 5.77 10.43 15.90 18.58
Time-to-maturity (maturity, year) 1,181,362 9.74 6.43 9.36 1.11 1.51 3.55 12.79 27.46 32.34
Amount Out (size, $billion) 1,181,362 0.48 0.34 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.62 1.58 2.76
Bond market beta (βBond) 667,060 1.06 0.86 0.90 -0.39 0.10 0.50 1.40 2.77 4.05
Downside risk (5% VaR) 660,335 6.28 4.91 5.04 0.84 1.42 3.01 7.98 15.72 24.89
ILLIQ 769,028 1.36 0.28 3.82 -0.78 -0.16 0.05 1.15 6.59 15.59
Panel B: Average cross-sectional correlations
CEI Rating Maturity Size βBond VaR ILLIQ
CEI 1 0.009 0.091 -0.078 -0.001 -0.026 0.009
Rating 1 -0.135 -0.055 0.112 0.436 0.096
Maturity 1 -0.009 0.365 0.219 0.094
Size 1 0.063 -0.108 -0.144




Table 2 Univariate Portfolios of Corporate Bonds Sorted by the Firm-Level
Carbon Emissions Intensity (CEI)
In Panel A, we form quintile portfolios of corporate bonds based on the firm-level carbon emissions intensity
(CEI) in June of each year t for firms with fiscal year ending in year t−1. The portfolio returns are calculated for
July of year t to June of year t+ 1 and then rebalanced. CEI is defined as the firm-level greenhouse gas emission
in CO2 equivalents divided by the total revenue of the firm in millions of dollars. Panel A reports results for the
scope 1 carbon emission, defined as greenhouse gas emissions generated from burning fossil fuels and production
processes which are owned or controlled by the company. The portfolios are value-weighted using amounts
outstanding as weights. Since carbon emission levels intrinsically vary across industries, we form portfolios
within each of the 12 Fama-French industries to control for the industry effect and the calculate the average
portfolio returns across industries. Quintile 1 is the portfolio with the lowest CEI and Quintile 5 is the portfolio
with the highest CEI. The table reports the average CEI, the next-month average excess return, the 5-factor
alpha from stock market factors, the 4-factor alpha from bond market factors, and the 9-factor alpha for each
quintile. The last row shows the differences monthly average returns and the differences in alphas with respect
to the factor models. The 5-factor model with stock market factors includes the excess stock market return
(MKTStock), the size factor (SMB), the book-to-market factor (HML), the stock momentum factor (MOM), and
the liquidity risk factor (LIQ). The 4-factor model with bond market factors includes the excess bond market
return (MKTBond), the downside risk factor (DRF), the credit risk factor (CRF), and the liquidity risk factor
(LRF). The 9-factor model combines 5 stock market factors and 4 bond market factors. The average returns
and alphas are defined in monthly percentage terms. Panel B reports the average bond portfolio characteristics
including the bond market beta (βBond), downside risk (5% Value-at-Risk), illiquidity (ILLIQ), credit rating,
time-to-maturity (years), and amount outstanding (size, in $billion) for each quintile. Panel C reports the
average firm-level characteristics including stock market beta (βStock), size (natural log of market equity), BM
(book-to-market), MOM (Returnt−12:t−2), Amihud measure of illiquidity, VOL (stock return volatility based on
the past 60 monthly returns), IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility based on the Fama-French 3 factor model using the
past 60 monthly returns), and institutional ownership (INST Stock, %). Panel D reports the average firm-level
fundamental characteristics including gross profitability, ROA (return-on-assets), ROE (return-on-equity),
Operating profitability, Debt-to-Equity ratio, Debt-to-Asset ratio, Tobin’s Q, Cash-to-Asset ratio, and firm age.
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are given in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate the significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from July 2006 to June 2019.
Panel A: Quintile portfolios of corporate bonds sorted by firm-level CEI
Quintiles Average Average 5-factor stock 4-factor bond 9-factor
CEI return alpha alpha alpha
Low 36.75 0.37 0.26 0.11 0.11
(3.66) (2.42) (2.38) (2.62)
2 153.18 0.35 0.24 0.03 0.04
(3.42) (2.31) (0.77) (1.00)
3 333.77 0.33 0.22 0.05 0.06
(3.42) (2.29) (1.08) (1.55)
4 518.59 0.31 0.21 0.03 0.03
(3.28) (2.14) (0.65) (0.68)
High 1127.34 0.23 0.13 -0.05 -0.04
(2.51) (1.30) (-0.69) (-0.84)
High − Low -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(-2.62) (-3.13) (-2.98) (-3.47)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel B: Average bond portfolio characteristics
βBond Downside Risk (5% VaR) ILLIQ Rating Maturity Size
Low 0.98 4.77 0.90 7.61 9.25 0.65
2 1.06 5.03 0.89 8.27 8.99 0.60
3 1.01 4.48 0.91 8.02 8.66 0.58
4 0.86 4.38 0.91 7.69 9.24 0.59
High 1.14 5.20 1.17 9.01 8.64 0.51
High − Low 0.15** 0.42*** 0.27*** 1.41*** -0.61*** -0.13***
(2.14) (3.56) (4.14) (13.15) (-8.67) (-10.24)
Panel C: Average firm characteristics
βStock Firm size BM MOM Amihud VOL (%) IVOL (%) INST Stock (%)
Low 1.11 23.95 0.54 0.10 0.16 8.22 6.35 70.42%
2 1.10 23.77 0.57 0.11 0.16 8.58 6.76 70.72%
3 1.09 23.94 0.53 0.11 0.15 8.09 6.19 70.54%
4 1.09 23.99 0.58 0.11 0.16 8.18 6.28 70.47%
High 1.19 23.38 0.62 0.11 0.21 9.09 7.07 74.78%
High − Low 0.09*** -0.56*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.88*** 0.72*** 4.36***
(3.29) (-9.34) (4.93) (0.60) (3.48) (5.95) (5.83) (7.55)
Panel D: Average firm characteristics (accounting fundamentals)
Gross profit/Assets ROA ROE Operating profit/Assets Debt/Equity ratio Debt/Assets Tobin’s Q Cash/Assets Age (yr)
Low 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.13 3.04 0.68 1.90 0.14 37.68
2 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.11 3.09 0.69 1.62 0.12 40.31
3 0.26 0.13 0.16 0.12 3.40 0.71 1.67 0.09 45.16
4 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.12 3.16 0.67 1.64 0.09 45.06
High 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.11 2.39 0.66 1.64 0.09 39.48
High − Low -0.07*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.65*** -0.02*** -0.26*** -0.05*** 1.80***
(-16.70) (-3.84) (-7.76) (-4.66) (-4.06) (-3.45) (-8.65) (-8.99) (3.66)
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Table 3 Subsample Analyses: Univariate Portfolios of Corporate Bonds Sorted by
the Firm-Level Carbon Emissions Intensity (CEI)
This table replicates Table 2 for (1) investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds, and (2) short- and long-
maturity bonds based on the median time-to-maturity, respectively.
Panel A: Investment-grade versus non-investment-grade bonds
Investment-grade Non-investment-grade
Average 9-factor Average 9-factor
return alpha return alpha
Low 0.37 0.08 0.41 0.25
(3.63) (1.99) (2.58) (2.19)
2 0.36 0.06 0.44 0.13
(3.86) (1.62) (2.89) (1.27)
3 0.35 0.09 0.30 -0.05
(3.87) (2.76) (1.73) (-0.44)
4 0.35 0.06 0.34 0.06
(3.91) (1.65) (2.29) (0.78)
High 0.25 -0.02 0.14 -0.11
(1.98) (-0.64) (0.82) (-1.04)
High − Low -0.12** -0.10** -0.27*** -0.36***
(-2.17) (-2.01) (-3.54) (-4.08)
Panel B: Short- and long-maturity bonds
1 yr < Maturity ≤ 6 yr Maturity ≥ 6 yr
Average 9-factor Average 9-factor
return alpha return alpha
Low 0.26 0.12 0.47 0.13
(3.97) (3.79) (3.13) (2.44)
2 0.25 0.09 0.47 0.02
(3.75) (2.23) (3.16) (0.32)
3 0.21 0.08 0.44 -0.00
(3.31) (2.25) (2.99) (-0.05)
4 0.20 0.08 0.40 -0.03
(3.63) (2.95) (2.63) (-0.46)
High 0.17 -0.01 0.31 -0.10
(2.14) (-0.28) (2.08) (-1.62)
High − Low -0.10** -0.13*** -0.15** -0.23***
(-2.34) (-3.02) (-2.56) (-3.06)
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Table 4 Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions
This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regressions of future corporate bond excess returns on the logarithm of carbon emissions intensity (CEI), with
and without controls. The dependent variable is the corporate bond excess return from July of year t to June of
year t+ 1 and key independent variable independent variable ln(CEI) is based on the firm-level carbon emissions
intensity in June of each year t for firms with fiscal year ending in year t−1. Control variables include bond market
beta (βBond), bond characteristics (ratings, maturity, size), downside risk, bond-level illiquidity, and one-month
lagged returns. Ratings are in conventional numerical scores, where 1 refers to an AAA rating and 21 refers to a
C rating. A higher numerical score implies higher credit risk. Time-to-maturity is defined in terms of years and
Size is defined in terms of $billion. ILLIQ is the bond-level illiquidity computed as the autocovariance of the daily
price changes within each month. We also control for systematic risk betas such as the default beta (βDEF ), term
beta (βTERM ), macroeconomic uncertainty beta (βUNC), and climate change news beta (βClimate). Newey-West
(1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses to determine the statistical significance of the average intercept
and slope coefficients. The last row reports the average adjusted R2 values and we control for the Fama-French
12 industry fixed effects in all specifications. Numbers in bold denote statistical significance at the 5% level or
below.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Univariate Controlling for Controlling for systematic Controlling for
bond characteristics and climate change news betas all variables
ln(CEI) -0.046 -0.042 -0.038 -0.036
(-2.76) (-2.59) (-2.51) (-2.30)
βBond 0.225 0.244
(3.17) (3.77)




















Intercept 0.251 0.276 0.260 0.208
(1.86) (1.94) (2.13) (2.09)
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.045 0.248 0.122 0.270
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Table 5 Robustness Checks
This table conducts a battery of robustness checks. Panel A reports results using different categories of a firm’s carbon emissions based on the scope
2 emissions scaled by total revenue, as well as scope 1 and scope 2 emissions combined, as the main measure of CEI. Panel B investigates whether the
main results remain intact when excluding the most carbon-intensive industries such as the energy, chemicals, and utilities industries. Panel C conducts
firm-level analyses and uses three different approaches to control for the effect of multiple bonds issued by the same firm by (1) forming the value-weighted
average of the bond returns across the same firm, (2) picking one bond of the largest size, and (3) picking the most liquid bond as representative of the
firm and replicate the portfolio-level analysis using this firm-level data set. Panel D conducts subperiod analyses for the two subperiods based on a six-year
interval.
Panel A: Quintile portfolios of corporate bonds sorted by firm-level scope 2 carbon emissions and scope 1 and 2 combined
Scope 2 carbon emissions only Scope 1 and 2 carbon emissions combined (Total Scope)
Average 5-factor stock 4-factor bond 9-factor Average 5-factor stock 4-factor bond 9-factor
return alpha alpha alpha return alpha alpha alpha
Low 0.36 0.26 0.09 0.08 Low 0.36 0.26 0.09 0.08
(3.77) (2.49) (2.41) (2.56) (3.77) (2.51) (2.41) (2.53)
2 0.37 0.26 0.08 0.08 2 0.36 0.26 0.06 0.07
(3.81) (2.58) (2.65) (3.09) (3.65) (2.51) (1.61) (2.24)
3 0.34 0.24 0.07 0.07 3 0.31 0.19 0.03 0.04
(3.68) (2.59) (1.75) (1.94) (3.09) (1.88) (0.71) (1.06)
4 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.01 4 0.36 0.26 0.07 0.06
(3.30) (2.29) (0.05) (0.32) (3.96) (2.96) (1.95) (1.92)
High 0.23 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 High 0.25 0.11 -0.07 -0.07
(1.94) (0.67) (-0.94) (-0.97) (2.23) (0.98) (-1.12) (-1.23)
High − Low -0.12* -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.15*** High − Low -0.11** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16***
(-1.90) (-2.87) (-2.93) (-3.04) (-2.17) (-3.15) (-3.08) (-3.23)
Panel B: Excluding the most carbon-intensive industries
Excluding energy industry only Excluding chemicals industry only Excluding utilities industry only Excluding all three industries
Average 9-factor Average 9-factor Average 9-factor Average 9-factor
return alpha return alpha return alpha return alpha
Low 0.37 0.09 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.09 0.36 0.08
(3.63) (2.72) (3.56) (2.33) (3.63) (2.63) (3.44) (2.34)
2 0.37 0.09 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.03 0.36 0.08
(3.86) (2.89) (3.27) (0.73) (3.36) (0.88) (3.65) (2.49)
3 0.35 0.09 0.32 0.04 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.06
(3.59) (2.39) (3.24) (1.16) (3.35) (1.29) (3.29) (1.61)
4 0.31 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.31 0.02 0.29 0.03
(3.29) (0.87) (3.21) (0.72) (3.22) (0.52) (3.14) (0.77)
High 0.28 -0.00 0.25 -0.06 0.25 -0.06 0.25 -0.04
(2.79) (-0.11) (2.33) (-1.21) (2.32) (-1.16) (2.38) (-0.85)
High − Low -0.09** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.12***
(-2.17) (-2.78) (-2.87) (-3.57) (-2.58) (-3.59) (-2.39) (-3.04)
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Table 5 (Continued)
Panel C: Firm-level analysis
Firm-level bond returns Largest bond Most liquid bond
Average 9-factor Average 9-factor Average 9-factor
return alpha return alpha return alpha
Low 0.39 0.13 0.38 0.10 0.38 0.11
(4.03) (2.89) (3.80) (3.02) (4.05) (3.00)
2 0.37 0.08 0.33 -0.00 0.33 0.03
(3.77) (1.82) (2.92) (-0.06) (3.05) (0.53)
3 0.28 0.02 0.35 0.06 0.25 -0.04
(2.90) (0.42) (3.55) (1.30) (2.39) (-0.71)
4 0.33 0.06 0.31 0.00 0.32 0.03
(3.46) (1.64) (3.05) (0.01) (3.32) (0.61)
High 0.29 0.01 0.24 -0.05 0.25 -0.01
(2.92) (0.11) (2.20) (-1.01) (2.32) (-0.24)
High − Low -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.15** -0.15*** -0.13** -0.12**
(-2.78) (-2.93) (-2.44) (-3.43) (-2.50) (-2.42)
Panel D: Subperiod analysis
Excluding crisis period (2008 – 2009) 1st Subperiod: July 2006 to June 2013 2nd subperiod: July 2013 to June 2019
Average 9-factor Average 9-factor Average 9-factor
return alpha return alpha return alpha
Low 0.35 0.06 0.40 0.17 0.34 0.10
(4.48) (2.21) (2.42) (2.11) (3.09) (1.87)
2 0.31 0.01 0.42 0.13 0.26 -0.08
(3.97) (0.24) (2.65) (2.33) (2.20) (-1.92)
3 0.32 0.03 0.40 0.15 0.26 -0.05
(4.23) (1.00) (2.50) (2.47) (2.52) (-1.67)
4 0.33 0.05 0.32 0.03 0.31 -0.00
(4.36) (1.62) (2.02) (0.61) (2.98) (-0.08)
High 0.21 -0.06 0.22 0.01 0.23 -0.01
(3.24) (-1.53) (1.59) (0.07) (2.22) (-1.87)
High − Low -0.14** -0.12*** -0.18** -0.16** -0.11* -0.10**
(-2.21) (-3.17) (-2.06) (-2.46) (-1.96) (-2.48)
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Table 6 Carbon Emissions Intensity, Institutional Ownership, and Corporate
Bond Returns
Panel A of this table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions of changes in corporate bonds’ institutional ownership on firms’ carbon emissions intensity.
The dependent variable is the change in bonds’ institutional ownership (∆INST), defined as the institutional
ownership in June of year t+ 1 minus the institutional ownership in June of year t. For a given bond i in month












where Holdingijt is the par amount holdings of institution j on bond i, OutstandingAmtit is bond i’s outstanding
amount, and hjt is the fraction of the outstanding amount held by institution j, in percentage. The key
independent variable is the logarithm of firm-level carbon emissions intensity in June of each year t for firms
with fiscal year ending in year t − 1. Control variables include bond market beta (βBond), bond characteristics
(ratings, maturity, size), downside risk, bond-level illiquidity (ILLIQ), and past six-month cumulative bond returns
(Rt−7:t−2). We also control for systematic risk betas such as the default beta (β
DEF ), term beta (βTERM ),
macroeconomic uncertainty beta (βUNC), and climate change news beta (βClimate). To interpret their economic
significance, all the independent variables in Panel A are standardized cross-sectionally to a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. Panel B replicates Table 4 by including additional controls of the contemporaneous
changes in bonds’ institutional ownership (∆INST Bond). The dependent variable in Panel B is the corporate
bond excess return from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in
parentheses to determine the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients. The last
row reports the average adjusted R2 values and we control for the Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects in all
specifications. Numbers in bold denote statistical significance at the 5% level or below.
Panel A: Carbon emission intensity and changes in institutional ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.var = ∆INST Bond Univariate Controlling for Controlling for systematic Controlling for
bond characteristics and climate change news betas all variables
ln(CEI) -0.471 -0.211 -0.489 -0.226
(-3.66) (-2.65) (-4.51) (-2.42)
βBond 0.312 0.276
(5.18) (3.49)




















Intercept -2.224 -2.098 -2.583 -2.112
(-4.12) (-3.70) (-4.41) (-3.80)
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.016 0.277 0.033 0.280
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Table 6 (Continued)
Panel B: Carbon emissions intensity, changes in institutional ownership, and bond returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.var = Returnt+1:t+12 Univariate Controlling for Controlling for systematic Controlling for
bond characteristics and eclimate risk beta all variables
ln(CEI) -0.039 -0.036 -0.031 -0.027
(-2.59) (-2.03) (-2.35) (-2.15)
∆INST Bond 0.125 0.134 0.042 0.122
(0.60) (0.79) (0.21) (0.73)
βBond 0.066 0.148
(1.12) (2.32)




















Intercept 0.153 0.311 0.260 0.208
(0.72) (1.60) (2.13) (2.09)
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.046 0.256 0.122 0.270
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Table 7 Carbon Emissions Intensity and Cash Flow Surprises
This table reports the panel regression of earnings/revenue surprise on firms’ carbon emission intensity. The
dependent variable are earnings surprise (SUE), revenue surprise (SURGE), and earnings announcement return
CAR(−2, +1). SUE is defined as the change in split-adjusted quarterly earnings per share from its value
four quarters ago divided by the standard deviation of this change over the prior eight quarters (four quarters
minimum). SURGE is defined as the change in revenue per share from its value four quarters ago divided by the
standard deviation of this change over the prior eight quarters (four quarters minimum). CAR(−2, +1) is defined
as four-day cumulative abnormal return from two days before to one day after the earning announcement day
(day 0), where daily abnormal return is the difference between daily stock return and the CRSP value-weighted
market index return. The independent variable is ln(CEI), which is defined as the nature logarithm of carbon
emission intensity (scope 1) in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1. Firm size is defined as the natural
logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market is the book equity for the
fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided by the market equity at the end of December of year t− 1. Book
value of equity equals the value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credits, and minus
the book value of preferred stock. ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items in the fiscal year ending
in calendar year t − 1 divided by average book value of equity in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1.
R&D is defined as R&D expenditures in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided by sales in calendar
year t− 1. Investment is defined as the annual growth in total assets in fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1.
OCF is defined as operating cash flows in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1 divided by lagged total
assets. INST Stock is defined as the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings at the end of December
of year t− 1. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative holding period returns from month t− 12 to t− 2
preceding the quarterly earnings announcement month. Industry is based on Fama-French 12 industry categories.
The unit of analysis is at firm-quarter level. All variables are winsorized at 2.5% level, except for firm size and
MOM. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm level. ***, **, and *
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Variables SUE SURGE CAR (−2, +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (CEI) -0.0177*** -0.0128** -0.0446*** -0.0262*** -0.0004*** -0.0005**
(-5.48) (-2.19) (-12.29) (-4.20) (-2.60) (-1.99)
Dependent Variablet-1 0.3259*** 0.3237*** 0.7441*** 0.7394*** -0.0089 -0.0092
(29.91) (30.14) (102.15) (100.99) (-1.14) (-1.19)
Dependent Variablet-4 -0.1881*** -0.1893*** -0.0398*** -0.0444*** -0.0043 -0.0046
(-22.05) (-22.43) (-8.28) (-9.13) (-0.61) (-0.65)
Firm Size 0.0402*** 0.0410*** 0.0411*** 0.0382*** -0.0005 -0.0004
(4.85) (4.96) (5.43) (5.08) (-1.61) (-1.28)
BM -0.2813*** -0.2655*** -0.1855*** -0.1815*** -0.0013 -0.0009
(-12.70) (-11.38) (-7.17) (-6.62) (-0.91) (-0.62)
ROE -0.3164*** -0.3568*** 0.2154*** 0.2580*** 0.0027 0.0012
(-5.39) (-5.96) (3.25) (3.85) (0.81) (0.35)
R&D -1.1300*** -0.9871*** -0.7490*** -0.7030* 0.0169 0.0289*
(-4.49) (-2.97) (-2.74) (-1.91) (1.44) (1.75)
Investment -0.0065 0.0001 -0.1788*** -0.1644*** -0.0053** -0.0053**
(-0.14) (0.00) (-3.74) (-3.35) (-2.18) (-2.15)
OCF 0.5771*** 0.7639*** 0.7893*** 0.7867*** -0.0003 0.0040
(3.08) (3.90) (4.32) (3.95) (-0.05) (0.50)
INST Stock 0.1320*** 0.1333*** 0.2007*** 0.1745*** 0.0050** 0.0053**
(3.08) (3.09) (5.02) (4.35) (2.34) (2.43)
MOM 0.4454*** 0.4397*** 0.2733*** 0.2757*** -0.0025* -0.0026**
(7.40) (7.37) (7.09) (6.95) (-1.94) (-2.01)
Constant -0.6590*** -0.7187*** -0.6860*** -0.6589*** 0.0103 0.0077
(-3.30) (-3.55) (-3.83) (-3.63) (1.29) (0.94)
Industry FEs NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.1970 0.1990 0.6270 0.6290 0.0074 0.0075
Observations 28,691 28,691 28,654 28,654 28,666 28,666
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Table 8 Carbon Emissions Intensity and Change in Firm Creditworthiness
This table reports the panel regression of change in firm creditworthiness on firms’ carbon emission intensity. In
columns (1), the dependent variable is ∆Rating, which is defined as the bond credit rating in June of year t+ 1
minus the bond credit rating in June of year t. Ratings are in conventional numerical scores, where 1 refers to
an AAA rating and 21 refers to a C rating. A higher numerical score implies higher credit risk. In column (2),
the dependent variable is ∆O Score, defined as the one-year ahead change of O-Score relative to the most recent
quarter before June of year t. The independent variable is ln(CEI), defined as the nature logarithm of carbon
emission intensity (scope 1) in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1. Firm size is defined as the natural
logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market is the book equity for the
fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided by the market equity at the end of December of year t− 1. Book
value of equity equals the value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credits, and minus
the book value of preferred stock. ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items in the fiscal year ending
in calendar year t − 1 divided by average book value of equity in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1.
R&D is defined as R&D expenditures in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided by sales in calendar
year t− 1. Investment is defined as the annual growth in total assets in fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1.
OCF is defined as operating cash flows in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1 divided by lagged total
assets. INST Stock is defined as the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings at the end of December
of year t − 1. Industry is based on Fama-French 12 industry categories. The unit of analysis for ∆Rating is at
bond-year level, and for ∆O Score is at firm-year level. All variables are winsorized at 2.5% level, except for firm
size. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by bond level in column (1) and
firm level in column (2). ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.




















Bond FEs YES -
Industry FEs - YES
Year FEs YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.2130 0.1120
Observations 43,485 4,500
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Table 9 Carbon Emissions Intensity and Environmental Incidents
This table reports the panel regression of the frequency of environmental incidents on firms’ carbon emissions
intensity. The dependent variable is Ln(1 + Incidents), defined as the nature logarithm of one plus the sum of
all positive changes in the RepRisk Index from June of year t to June of year t+ 1. To ensure we capture a firm’s
environmental incidents rather than the S and G aspects of the RepRisk Index, we require the percentage of
environmental issues used to compute the RepRisk Index is greater than 50%. Ln(1 + Incidents) has a value of
zero when there is no ESG incidents in the year. The key independent variable is ln(CEI), defined as the natural
logarithm of carbon emissions intensity (scope 1) in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1. Firm size is
defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market is the
book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided by the market equity at the end of December
of year t − 1. Book value of equity equals the value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment
tax credits, and minus the book value of preferred stock. ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items in
the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1 divided by average book value of equity in the fiscal year ending in
calendar year t− 1. R&D is defined as R&D expenditures in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided
by sales in calendar year t− 1. Investment is defined as the annual growth in total assets in fiscal year ending in
calendar year t− 1. OCF is defined as operating cash flows in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t− 1 divided
by lagged total assets. INST Stock is defined as the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings at the end
of December of year t − 1. The unit of analysis is at firm-year level. All variables are winsorized at 2.5% level,
except for firm size. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm level. ***,






















Industry FEs NO YES
Time FEs YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.1790 0.2110
Observations 6,674 6,674
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